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Shu-Yi Oei* & Diane M. Ring** 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The past few years have seen the rise of a new model of production and 
consumption of goods and services, often referred to as the “sharing 
economy.” Fueled by startups such as Uber and Airbnb, sharing enables 
individuals to obtain rides, accommodations, and other goods and services 
from peers via the Internet or mobile application in exchange for payment. 
The rise of sharing has raised questions about how it should be regulated, 
including whether existing laws and regulations can and should be enforced 
in this new sector or whether new ones are needed.  
In this Article, we explore those questions in the context of taxation. We 
argue that, contrary to the claims of some commentators, the application of 
substantive tax law to sharing is mostly (though not completely) clear, 
because current law generally contains the concepts and categories 
necessary to tax sharing. However, tax enforcement and compliance may 
present challenges, as a result of two distinctive features of sharing. First, 
some sharing businesses tend to opportunistically pick the more favorable 
regulatory interpretation if there is ambiguity regarding which rule applies 
or whether a rule applies. This leads to compliance and enforcement gaps. 
Second, the “microbusiness” nature of sharing raises unique compliance 
and enforcement concerns. We suggest strategies for addressing these dual 
challenges, including lower information reporting thresholds, safe harbors 
and advance rulings to simplify tax reporting, and targeted enforcement 
efforts. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The past few years have seen the rise of a new mode of production and 
consumption of goods and services. In this so-called “sharing economy,” 
startups such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit enable consumers to 
summon rides, rent accommodations, or hire help from peers via the 
internet or a mobile app, in exchange for payment.1 On the supply side, 
these models enable owners of homes, apartments or vehicles, or those who 
possess certain skills (such as house painting, home organization, or 
dogsitting) to monetize those assets or skills.2 The technological platforms 
employed by these startups enable individual producers and consumers to 
transact with each other with unprecedented ease.3  
Also known as “collaborative consumption,” the “peer-to-peer 
economy” or “peer-to-peer consumption,” a broad range of commentators 
suggest that the sharing economy is transforming the way people consume 
and supply goods and services, such as transportation, accommodations, 
and task help.4 Commentators note that sharing arrangements have the 
potential to significantly affect traditional industries such as taxicabs, 
limousine services, and the hotel industry.5 As such, the sharing economy 
                                                
1 See generally UBER, https://www.uber.com, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com,  
TASKRABBIT,  https://www.taskrabbit.com. 
2 THE PEOPLE WHO SHARE, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140318160538/http://www.thepeoplewhoshare.com/blog/w
hat-is-the-sharing-economy/ (describing the sharing economy as “the shared creation, 
production, distribution, trade and consumption of goods and services by different people 
and organisations.”); The Rise of the Sharing Economy, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013 
(print edition) available at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-
everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy.  
3 See sources cited note 2. 
4 See, e.g., Pricewaterhouse Coopers, “The sharing economy:  how will it disrupt your 
business?” (August 2014), http://pwc.blogs.com/files/sharing-economy-final_0814.pptx 
(estimating that “[f]ive key sharing sectors (P2P finance, online staffing, P2P 
accommodation, car sharing and music/video streaming) have the potential to increase 
global revenues from around $15 billion now to around $335 billion by 2025” and warning 
that “[i]ncumbents need to see disruption coming from an expansion of sharing and 
develop effective strategies to respond, whether by acquisition, partnership or launching 
their own sharing services.”); NPR Special Series: The Sharing Economy: A Shift Away 
From Ownership, http://www.npr.org/series/244583579/the-sharing-economy-a-shift-
away-from-ownership (exploring different aspects of the sharing economy). We note that 
the popular press has, in some sense, been ahead of scholars in examining the sharing 
economy, interviewing its participants, and commenting on its development. 
5 See, e.g., Georgios Zervas, Davide Proserpio & John Byers, The Rise of the Sharing 
Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry (Feb. 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898.  
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raises important legal and regulatory issues, including questions of whether 
and how the new startups should be regulated and questions about the 
appropriate relationship between regulation and innovation.6  
One set of emerging questions concerns whether existing laws and 
regulations are adequate and should be enforced in the sharing sector or 
whether new laws and regulations are needed.7 These questions have taken 
on particular urgency because of the perception that sharing economy 
businesses often ignore the law, choosing to lobby and negotiate with 
regulators only after the fact.8 Such questions have permeated the tax field 
as well.9 Some commentators claim that new sharing economy earners10 do 
                                                
6 See, e.g., Christopher Koopman et al, The Sharing Economy and Consumer 
Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change (Dec. 8, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535345; Stephen Miller, First 
Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy (Feb. 20, 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2568016; Stephen Miller, Transferable 
Sharing Rights: A Theoretical Model for Regulating Airbnb and the Short-Term Rental 
Market (Oct. 24, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2514178; Sofia Ranchordas, Does 
Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy (forthcoming, 
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492798; Sofia Ranchordas, 
Innovation-Friendly Regulation: The Sunset of Regulation, the Sunrise of Innovation (Nov. 
1, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2544291.  
7 Brad Tuttle, The Other Complication for Airbnb and the Sharing Economy: Taxes, 
TIME (Jun. 15, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/06/15/the-other-complication-for-
airbnb-and-the-sharing-economy-taxes/; All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, THE 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013) (print edition) available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21572914-collaborative-
consumption-technology-makes-it-easier-people-rent-items; Mike LaBoissiere, The 
Sharing Economy II: Taxes, TALKING PHILOSOPHY (July, 26, 2014),  
http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=8067;  Kathleen Pender, If you make money in the 
sharing economy the IRS will know, SFGate (Feb. 22, 2014 at 2:43pm) 
http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/If-you-make-money-in-the-sharing-
economy-the-IRS-5258941.php; 1099.IS, http://1099.is; Joyce E. Cutler, Cities Grappling 
with Challenges of How to Tax, Regulate Short-Term Rentals, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY 
TAX REPORT, Oct. 21, 2014. Some commentators suggest that new legal and regulatory 
regimes or categories may be required to address the challenges raised by sharing. Abbey 
Steimer, Betwix and Between: Regulating the Sharing Economy, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535656.; see also Daniel E. Rauch & 
David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government Policy: The Future of Local 
Regulation of the ‘Sharing Economy,’ (Jan. 14, 2015) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2549919. 
8 See, e.g., Jason Clampet, Sharing homes, cars—and lawsuits, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.com/travel/feature/20140501-sharing-homes-cars-and-lawsuits (describing 
sharing economy “sin-first, ask-forgiveness-later” strategy). 
9 See Tuttle, supra note 7; Cutler, supra note 7. See also UBER, 
http://blog.uber.com/davidplouffe (announcing hiring of political strategist David Plouffe); 
Emily Badge & Zachary Goldfarb, Uber hired David Plouffe when it realized ‘techies’ 
can’t do politics (Aug. 19, 2014), WASH. POST, 
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not know what tax rules apply, do not comply with the tax law, and may 
believe that sharing should not be taxed.11 Others argue that existing tax 
laws and regulations may need to be reconsidered, expanded, or modified in 
light of sharing’s rise.12 Prompted by such perceived uncertainty, websites, 
online commentaries, and tax advising services have popped up that advise 
sharing economy earners on the tax issues raised by sharing and on how to 
comply with their tax obligations.13  
Given the growth of sharing arrangements, we think it is important to be 
clear at the outset about whether and which of these claims are accurate, so 
as to avoid making ungrounded and poorly considered policy and regulatory 
decisions for this new industry.14 Thus, in this Article, we examine the 
broad question of whether tax law is adequate to the task of taxing sharing, 
or whether new tax rules and regulations are required. We argue that the 
application of substantive and doctrinal tax laws to sharing is generally 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/19/uber-hired-david-plouffe-
when-it-realized-techies-cant-do-politics/.   
10 This Article refers to the individuals offering goods and services in the sharing 
economy as “sharing economy earners” or “sharing earners.” It refers to the startups that 
facilitate such collaborative consumption as “sharing economy businesses” or “sharing 
businesses.” This Article refers to sharing economy earners and sharing economy 
businesses, collectively, as “sharing economy actors” or “sharing actors.” 
11 See Tuttle, supra note 7 (“it seems as if almost no one involved in the sharing 
economy knows exactly what taxes they’re supposed to pay, nor when or how to pay them. 
And for several reasons — the rules are unclear, enforcement is almost nonexistent, and 
many feel that “sharing” shouldn’t be taxed at all — very few people pay them.”) These 
sentiments may stem in part from the difficulty many cities and localities have faced in 
collecting city and local hotel and occupancy taxes from businesses like Airbnb. See, e.g., 
Dara Kerr, Airbnb Begins Collecting 14% Hotel Tax in San Francisco, CNET (Sept. 17, 
2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/airbnb-begins-collecting-14-hotel-tax-in-san-francisco/; 
Carolyn Said, S.F. could get $11 million  year when Airbnb collects hotel tax, SFGATE 
(Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/S-F-could-get-11-million-a-year-
when-Airbnb-5762838.php. 
12 See, e.g., John M. Barry and Paul L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transportation 
Innovation, and the Sharing Economy, 81 CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE (forthcoming 2015) 
(examining sharing economy under the fringe benefit rules of I.R.C. § 132). 
13 Lyft Drivers Frequently Asked Tax Questions, at http://lyfttaxfaqs.wordpress.com; 
Charles R. Goulding, Raymond Kumar, & Jack Goldman, Fast growth of sharing impacts 
tax reporting, AIPCA TAX INSIDER, (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://www.cpa2biz.com/Content/media/PRODUCER_CONTENT/Newsletters/Articles_2
014/Tax/Sharing-Economy-Impact.jsp ; Cutler, supra note 7; 1099.IS, http://1099.is; 
ZEN99, https://www.tryzen99.com; THE SHARED ECONOMY CERTIFIED PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTANT, http://www.sharedeconomycpa.com; INTUIT, 
http://www.intuit.com/company/press-room/press-releases/2015/Intuit-Uber-partner-QBO-
Self-Employed/. 
14 This Article’s focus is on the taxation of sharing economy earners, rather than 
sharing economy businesses and platforms. 
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(though not completely) clear and not particularly novel.15 This is the case 
even though the rules themselves may be complex and the application of the 
law to the facts may sometimes produce a measure of uncertainty. In most 
respects, what is required is clarification of the tax law’s application, rather 
than new legal or regulatory categories.  
On the other hand, tax compliance and enforcement in the sharing sector 
may present challenges, due largely to two distinctive features of sharing: 
First, in determining how and whether to comply with existing laws and 
regulations, sharing economy businesses have the propensity to pick the 
more favorable legal or regulatory regime if there is ambiguity as to which 
regime applies. For example, in light of slight ambiguity regarding the 
applicable Form 1099-K information reporting rules, some sharing 
businesses have taken the position that they are subject to the same 
information reporting rules as “third party settlement entities” such as 
Amazon and PayPal, and thus must comply with less onerous reporting 
thresholds.16 We refer to this set of behaviors as “tax opportunism.” We 
emphasize that this term is not meant to be pejorative; rather, it simply 
denotes the fact that the sharing businesses may be willing to take 
advantage of the opportunities presented by legal ambiguity. Tax 
opportunism more accurately describes some behaviors of certain sharing 
economy businesses than the claim that they are simply flouting the law. 
Furthermore, as we discuss, tax opportunism may be related to regulatory 
arbitrage, but the nuanced differences between the two categories may 
suggest that different regulatory responses are appropriate for each.  
Second, the sharing sector involves many individual earners who may 
earn relatively small income amounts, may use otherwise personal property 
for business purposes, and may be filing and reporting independent 
contractor income for the first time. These “microbusiness” characteristics 
may make compliance difficult for taxpayers and enforcement difficult for 
the IRS. These characteristics are not themselves unprecedented; in fact, the 
tax compliance issues that they entail are reasonably well understood.17  
However, the rise of sharing has propelled large numbers of earners who are 
engaged in sharing on a sporadic or part-time basis into the microbusiness 
                                                
15 But see Barry & Caron, supra note 12. 
16 See infra Part III.A.2. 
17 See, e.g., Susan Cleary Morse, Stuart Karlinsky, Joseph Bankman, Cash Businesses 
and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.37 (2009) (using field interviews of 275 cash 
business owners to identify patterns in taxpayer behavior, and circumstances under which 
evasion was most likely to occur). See also Joel Slemrod, Brett Collins, Jeffrey Hoopes, 
Daniel Reck, & Michael Sebastiani, Does Credit-card Information Reporting Improve 
Small-business Tax Compliance? (February 5, 2015) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2515630; 
Internal Revenue Service, Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006 (2012) available at 
www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf.  
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world. Such earners may have less incentive than fulltime businesses to take 
steps to ensure accuracy (for example, by hiring a tax preparer). Moreover, 
the fact that sharing may be a sector of first impression for many tax 
preparers may make tax compliance and enforcement even more 
challenging.  
We argue that the confluence of these two realities – tax opportunism 
paired with the microbusiness nature of sharing – may make it particularly 
difficult to ensure that the new sharing earners are complying with the tax 
laws. Yet, the precise impacts are difficult to predict with certainty.  
In Part I, we describe in brief the “sharing economy” phenomenon. In 
Part II, we discuss the substantive tax rules and doctrines that apply to 
sharing. We argue that in many (though not all) respects, existing tax laws 
and doctrines can be adequately applied to sharing, although such 
application may depend on factual interpretation and classification of the 
new transactions. In Part III, we define the parameters of the term “tax 
opportunism” and describe four examples of it: (1) the decision by certain 
sharing businesses to take the position that they are “third-party settlement 
organizations” for information reporting purposes; (2) the decision to 
embrace independent contractor classification for sharing earners; (3) the 
initial decision by Airbnb to take the position that it is not responsible for 
collecting local occupancy taxes; and (4) the decision of ridesharing 
businesses to operate outside taxicab medallion and permitting systems. 
Next, we discuss the potential problems raised by the microbusiness nature 
of sharing economy work.  
Finally, in Part IV, we suggest strategies for addressing sharing’s 
challenges. In Part IV.A, we consider relatively simple strategies that may 
help improve compliance and enforcement with federal tax laws. These 
include lowering information reporting thresholds, use of safe harbors and 
advance rulings to simplify expense taking, targeted enforcement efforts, 
and taxpayer education. In Parts IV.B. and IV.C, we review longer-term 
solutions and broader insights that may be employed by federal, state and 
local taxing authorities in confronting the sharing economy.   
This Article is the first in the tax literature to closely examine the 
doctrinal and compliance issues raised by sharing. However, some caveats 
must be noted. First, we have focused largely on ridesharing and home 
sharing. While sharing has emerged as an overarching concept in the press 
and in scholarly literature,18 our detailed tax study confirms that 
generalizations regarding the sharing economy, while possible, should be 
made carefully. This is likely to be true in other regulatory fields as well. 
The tax law example highlights this point rather well, because all types of 
                                                
18 See, e.g., Ranchordas, supra note 6; Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 7. 
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sharing must confront the tax law, and yet we observe variation in the 
specific tax rules and issues that arise in each sub-area of sharing. 
Second, because the sharing sector is so new, the tax return filing and 
compliance behaviors of sharing earners have not been subject to empirical 
study. In fact, the 2015 tax filing season may be the first time that many 
sharing earners will be reporting sharing income. While existing tax 
compliance studies focusing on self-employed workers and independent 
contractors may be informative, they cannot provide precise answers. 
Further empirical study is required to accurately assess the tax compliance 
behaviors of sharing economy earners. Our analysis in this article lays a 
roadmap for the conduct of such study.  
Finally, our inquiry takes place in a dynamic economic climate in which 
business models, practices, industries, and technologies are changing and 
evolving.19 Given this dynamism, it is possible that the tax strategies 
employed by the sharing businesses will change over time.20 It is also 
possible that as sharing economy earners become more familiar with tax 
compliance and tax reporting, their behaviors may change as well. Thus, the 
insights we develop in this Article are necessarily preliminary and will 
require ongoing attention and investigation. 
 
I.  THE SHARING ECONOMY 
 
While there is no universal definition of the term “sharing economy,” 
commentators have described it as a model of production, consumption and 
distribution of goods and services whereby people “share” their assets or 
other resources on an excess capacity basis via a peer-to-peer 
arrangement.21 For example, a homeowner or car owner might rent out a 
room or car she is not using.22 A car owner might offer rides in her personal 
vehicle in her free time.23 A person with a certain skill (such as computer 
repair or dogsitting) might provide that service sporadically to peers for a 
fee.24  
                                                
19 See, e.g., Deven Desai, The New Steam: On Digitization, Decentralization, and 
Disruption, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1469 (2014) (hypothesizing that established players will 
eventually adapt to the new decentralized sharing marketplace). 
20 In fact, sharing businesses have already changed some of their reporting positions. 
See infra Part III.A.2. 
21 See, e.g., THE PEOPLE WHO SHARE, supra note 2 (“The Sharing Economy is a socio-
economic ecosystem built around the sharing of human and physical resources.”). 
22 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/; RELAYRIDES, https://relayrides.com/; 
GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/.  
23 UBER, https://www.uber.com/; LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/.   
24 TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/; ZARLY, https://www.zaarly.com/; 
DOGVACAY, http://dogvacay.com/.  
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Such peer-to-peer sharing is facilitated by a number of companies, such 
as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit. A distinctive feature of these sharing 
economy businesses is the use of technology platforms (mobile phone 
applications and the internet) to bring producers, providers, and consumers 
of goods and services together, in exchange for a fee for using the 
platform.25 With the ease provided by such technology, almost anything—
bicycles, wifi, clothing, or even kittens—can be shared.26  
While informal pooling, renting, and borrowing arrangements are not 
new, access to Internet and mobile technology means that the scale, scope, 
frequency, and transformative potential of such sharing transactions has 
reached an unprecedented degree.27 The global sharing market is valued in 
the billions, and the valuation of sharing businesses like Airbnb and Uber 
has surpassed that of some hotel and car rental competitors.28 The impact of 
                                                
25 The Rise of the Sharing Economy, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013 (print edition) 
available at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-
rise-sharing-economy.  
26 See, e.g., SPINLISTER, https://www.spinlister.com/ (bicycles); FON, 
https://corp.fon.com/en (wifi); POSHMARK, https://poshmark.com/ (fashion); 
NEIGHBORGOODS,  http://neighborgoods.net/ (household and related goods); see also Dan 
Hedgpeth, Need. Snuggle? Uber Delivers Kittens on Demand, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/local/wp/2014/10/29/need-a-snuggle-uber-
delivers-kittens-on-demand/ (Uber delivery of kittens); LEFTOVERSWAP, 
http://leftoverswap.com/index.html (sharing of leftover food). 
27 See PWC Study, supra note 4 (estimating that potential revenue from five sharing 
sectors could potentially be $335bn by 2025); see also Sarah Cannon & Lawrence 
Summers, How Uber and the Sharing Economy Can Win Over Regulators (Oct. 13, 2014), 
https://hbr.org/2014/10/how-uber-and-the-sharing-economy-can-win-over-regulators/  
(“Sharing economy firms are disrupting traditional industries across the globe. For proof, 
look no further than Airbnb which, at $10 billion, can boast a higher valuation than the 
Hyatt hotel chain. Uber is currently valued at $18.2 billion relative to Hertz at $12.5 billion 
and Avis at $5.2 billion. Beyond individual firms, there are now more than 1,000 cities 
across four continents where people can share cars. The global sharing economy market 
was valued at $26 billion in 2013 and some predict it will grow to become a $110 billion 
revenue market in the coming years, making it larger than the U.S. chain restaurant 
industry. The revenue flowing through the sharing economy directly into people’s wallets 
will surpass $3.5 billion this year, with growth exceeding 25%, according to Forbes.”); 
Kathleen Kusek, The Sharing Economy Goes Five Star (July 15, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenkusek/2014/07/15/the-sharing-economy-goes-five-
star/ (also noting Forbes’ estimate).  
28 See sources cited supra note 27; see also Dan Primack, Uber Now Worth More than 
Hertz (Jun. 6, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/06/06/uber-is-now-worth-more-than-hertz/. 
But see Aswath Damodaran, A Disruptive Cab Ride to Riches: The Uber Payoff (Jun. 9, 
2014), http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2014/06/a-disruptive-cab-ride-to-riches-
uber.html (disputing Uber’s $17 million valuation as of June 2014); Aswath Damodaran, 
Up, up, and away! A crowd-valuation of Uber! (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2014/12/up-up-and-away-crowd-valuation-of-
uber.html.    
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sharing has been so significant that commentators frequently refer to 
sharing-based consumption and production as “disruptive” of traditional 
industries such as hotels and taxicabs.29  
In the remainder of this Part, we describe key characteristics and recent 
developments in ridesharing, home sharing, and other types of sharing.    
 
A.  Vehicle Ridesharing 
 
1. Uber 
 
Uber is regarded by many as the market leader in the peer-to-peer ride 
service sector.30 The service is available in over 140 U.S. cities and 52 
foreign countries.31 Uber uses a smartphone application to connect 
customers with drivers of vehicles for hire. Uber’s basic business model 
involves partnering with local owners of licensed private car companies and 
also with ordinary citizens driving their personal vehicles. Uber does not 
own cars. The drivers themselves decide whether and when to open up the 
application and accept requests for rides from customers. Thus, Uber 
regards itself as a marketplace for provision of services by these individual 
drivers, and treats the drivers as independent contractors.32  
On the other hand, Uber itself sets the fares charged for rides, and fares 
depend in part on the “level” of service provided. UberX is Uber’s best 
known division and allows drivers to use their own vehicles to offer rides to 
customers at fares often significantly lower than taxi fares for comparable 
trips.33 To apply to become an UberX driver, all that is required is a driver’s 
                                                
29 Ryan Smith, Sharing Economy Fuels Spirit of Disruption, WALL ST. J., (May 5, 
2014 at 2:44pm), http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/2014/05/05/ryan-smith-sharing-
economy-fuels-spirit-of-disruption/ (referring to the sharing economy’s “spirit of 
disruption”); Andrew Hawkins, More Evidence Uber is Wiping Out City Taxi Industry’s 
Value (Feb. 22, 2015), 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20150222/TRANSPORTATION/150229973/more-
evidence-uber-is-wiping-out-city-taxi-industrys-value.  
30 UBER, https://www.uber.com/; Erin Griffith, Uber v. Lyft: The Credit Cards Don’t 
Lie, Fortune (Sept. 11, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/09/11/uber-vs-lyft-the-credit-cards-
dont-lie/. 
31 UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities.  
32 UBER, https://get.uber.com/drive/; UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms.  
33Additionally, Uber charges a $1/trip “safe rides fee.” See Olivia Nuzzi, Uber’s “Safe 
Rides Fee” Too Little, Too Late, THE DAILY BEAST (April 22, 2014), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/22/uber-s-safe-rides-fee-is-too-little-too-
late.html; UBER, https://support.uber.com/hc/en-us/articles/201950566-What-is-the-Safe-
Rides-Fee-. Leena Rao, Uber Brings Its Disruptive Car Service to Chicago, TECH CRUNCH 
(Sept. 22, 2011),  http://techcrunch.com/2011/09/22/uber-brings-its-disruptive-car-service-
to-chicago/; Alex Wilhem, In Another Strike Against The Competition, Uber Lowers UberX 
Prices in San Diego, LA, and DC, TECH CRUNCH (OCT. 3, 2013), 
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license, ownership of one’s own car (2005 or newer), proper insurance, and 
clearing a DMV and background check.34  
Uber also offers other services in certain markets. UberBlack is a 
traditional “Black Car” service that resembles typical limousine services. In 
many US cities, Uber riders also have the option of UberLUX,35 a luxury 
car service; UberSUV,36 a full-sized luxury SUV; UberTAXI,37 a licensed 
taxicab; UberXL,38 a non-luxury SUV; and UberPool, a reduced-fare pooled 
ride service.39 Although the scope and increasing variety of Uber services 
offers interesting insights into market development, for purposes of this 
Article, our focus is on the basic car-sharing model, UberX, which we will 
generally refer to as Uber. 
A distinctive characteristic of Uber’s fare structure is its use of varying 
levels of pricing, depending on demand.40 Under such dynamic or “surge” 
pricing, changes in fare price are driven algorithmically when wait times 
increase, and unfulfilled requests start to rise. Sometimes these fare 
increases occur because of a demand surge during high traffic times like 
Friday or Saturday night. Other times, they can occur because of special 
conditions,41 such as a holiday or inclement weather.42 Uber’s “surge 
pricing” has triggered significant public reaction43 and has even given rise 
to competing applications such as Gett.44 Uber fares include an automatic 
                                                                                                                       
http://techcrunch.com/2013/10/03/in-another-strike-against-the-competition-uber-lowers-
uberx-prices-in-san-diego-la-and-dc/.  
34 UBER, http://blog.uber.com/partnersfulltime.  
35 Michael Carney, Uber Launches Uberlux Services in LA, Offers High-priced Rides 
in Teslas, Mercedes, and BMWs, PANDO DAILY (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://pando.com/2014/12/19/uber-launches-uberlux-service-in-la-offers-high-priced-rides-
in-teslas-mercedes-and-bmws/.  
36 UBER NYC, http://www.driveubernyc.com/cars/.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 UBER, https://blog.uber.com/uberpool (describing UberPool as “a bold social 
experiment”). 
40 UBER, https://support.uber.com/hc/en-us/articles/201836656-What-is-surge-pricing-
and-how-does-it-work-. 
41 David Streitfeld, As It Shakes Up the Taxi Business, Uber’s a Target, BOSTON 
GLOBE (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/01/27/uber-hits-rough-
patch/2zON2vyXha5AVhs5N15csI/story.html. 
42 Douglas Macmillan, Uber CEO: Surge Pricing Is Here to Stay, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 
2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304887104579306622013546350. 
43 Uber Rage: Bostonians Irate Over Price Surge in Snow Rides, METRO (Dec. 14, 
2013), http://www.metro.us/local/uber-rage-bostonians-irate-over-price-surge-in-snow-
rides-metro-us/tmWmlo---21bnYkB3zwpZk/. 
44 Seth Porges, Tired of Uber’s Unpredictable Surge Pricing? This Car-hailing App 
Hopes You’ll Switch, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2014 at 8:41 pm), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sethporges/2014/03/30/tired-of-ubers-unpredictable-surge-
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20% tip, and Uber tells customers that there is no need to give drivers an 
additional tip.45 This tip policy has created some dissatisfaction among 
drivers, leading to litigation.46 Uber also charges a $1 “safes ride” fee.47  
In exchange for creating and providing the app-based marketplace for 
rides, Uber takes a portion of the gross fares (20%) generated by drivers.48 
There is some suggestion that Uber may also be keeping a percentage of its 
automatic tip amount as well, and there is an active lawsuit over this issue.49 
Uber also charges drivers a $10 per week fee for the drivers’ use of the 
Uber-ready smartphone application. Drivers are responsible for their own 
expenses, including gas, equipment maintenance, and repairs.   
Uber offers drivers a commercial insurance policy that covers accidents 
occurring from the time the driver accepts a customer until the end of the 
trip.50 The policy covers both driver liability as well as uninsured motorists, 
and also includes contingent comprehensive and collision insurance.51 Uber 
has also instituted a “gap” insurance policy to cover accidents happening 
when UberX drivers are not ferrying customers but are logged onto the 
                                                                                                                       
pricing-this-car-hailing-app-hopes-youll-switch/. 
45 UBER, https://support.uber.com/hc/en-us/articles/202290128-Do-I-have-to-tip-my-
driver-. But see Jay Barmann, Now Uber Drivers Want You To Tip, SFIST (Feb. 2. 2015), 
http://sfist.com/2015/02/17/now_uber_drivers_want_you_to_tip.php.  
46 Bob Egelko, Uber Drivers’ Suit Over Tips Clears Hurdle, SFGATE (Dec. 7, 2013 at 
4:16pm), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Uber-drivers-suit-over-tips-clears-hurdle-
5044858.php; Maya Kosoff, Uber's Drivers Say They Don't Get Any Tip Money From All-
Inclusive Fares — And They're Furious, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 7, 2014 at 3:09pm), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/ubers-drivers-say-they-dont-get-any-tip-money-from-all-
inclusive-fares-2014-9; Luz Lazo, Some Uber Drivers Say Company’s Promise of Big Pay 
Day Doesn’t’ Match Reality, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/some-uber-drivers-say-
companys-promise-of-big-pay-day-doesnt-match-reality/2014/09/06/17f5d82c-224a-11e4-
958c-268a320a60ce_story.html. 
47 UBER, https://support.uber.com/hc/en-us/articles/201950566-What-is-the-Safe-
Rides-Fee- (fee supports local background checks and related safety measures). But see 
litigation regarding this fee, Ellen Huet, Uber Fades Class-Action Lawsuit Over $1 ‘Safe 
Rides Fee’, FORBES (Dec. 27, 2014, 2:14am), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/27/uber-class-action-lawsuit-safe-rides-
fee/.  
48 David Fagin, Life as An Uber Drive r: It’s Just Not Fare, HUFF. POST (Feb. 2, 2014 
at 3:47pm), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-fagin/life-as-an-uber-
driver_b_4698299.html. According to Uber’s website, Uber’s cut may be as low as 5% in 
certain circumstances, though the 20% rate seems more prevalent. UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/en-US/driver-referral/uberx. 
49 Maya Kosoff, Here’s How Uber’s Tipping Policy Puts Drivers at a Disadvantage, 
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2014 at 2:26pm), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-tipping-
policy-2014-10;  Elko, supra note 46. 
50 UBER, https://blog.uber.com/uberXridesharinginsurance.  
51 Id. 
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Uber application and accepting customers.52 This contingent policy covers 
driver liability in the event that the driver’s personal insurance policy will 
not cover a “gap” period accident. 
 
2. Lyft and Sidecar 
 
In addition to Uber, other peer-to-peer ride services have also arisen in 
various markets. Lyft is probably Uber’s foremost competitor in the 
ridesharing market.53 UberX and Lyft are similar services54 and have nearly 
identical business models.55 Like Uber, Lyft connects passengers and 
drivers through Lyft’s smartphone application.56 Like Uber, Lyft offers a 
basic service (Lyft), a shared ride service (Lyft Line) and a six-passenger 
premium ride service (Lyft Plus).57 Like Uber, Lyft also elevates fares 
during periods when demand is high;58 and like Uber, Lyft provides a 
liability insurance policy for periods when a Lyft driver is ferrying a 
customer.59 There are some differences, however. For example, Lyft 
customers are prompted to pay within the app after the ride, and are able to 
tip the driver using the Lyft application, though a tip is not required.60 The 
Uber application currently does not allow additional tipping, although a 
petition is underway to change this.61 Lyft, like Uber, takes a 20% cut of the 
                                                
52 Id.  
53 See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Accusations Fly Between Uber and Lyft, NY TIMES BITS, 
(August 12, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/accusations-fly-between-uber-
and-lyft/?_r=0.  
54 Farhad Manjoo, Uber and Lyft Have Become Indistinguishable Commodities, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS (Aug. 28, 2014 at 2;27 pm), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/uber-
and-lyft-have-become-indistinguishable-commodities/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
55 Lyft v. Uber: What’s the Difference Between These Two Dueling Apps, INQUISITR 
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.inquisitr.com/1409677/lyft-vs-uber-whats-the-difference-
between-these-dueling-apps/. 
56 See, e.g., LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/help/article/1450425.  
57 LYFT, https://www.lyft.com  
58 LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/help/article/1353884. 
59 LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/drive/help/article/1229170.  
60 LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/help/article/1003538; Uber’s tipping policy was one of 
the factors that contributed to a recent strike and lawsuit by Uber drivers.  See Maya 
Kosoff, Uber Drivers Across the Country Are Protesting Tomorrow – Here’s Why, BUS. 
INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2014 at 8:10am), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-drivers-across-
the-country-are-protesting-tomorrow--heres-why-2014-10; Michael B. Farrell, New 
Lawsuit Claims Uber Exploits Its Drivers, BOSTON GLOBE (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/06/26/uber-hit-with-class-action-
lawsuit/JFlTJLMuBoXuEmMU3elTAI/story.html.  
61 Dana Kerr, To tip or not to tip drivers, that is Uber’s question, CNET MAG. (Feb. 
16, 2015), http://www.cnet.com/news/to-tip-or-not-to-tip-drivers-that-is-ubers-question/. 
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base fare; however, Lyft drivers keep 100% of all tips.62 
Sidecar represents yet another variant of a peer-to-peer ride service.63 
Unlike Uber and Lyft, Sidecar gives drivers and passengers more flexibility 
in setting terms – for example, in choosing rides based on drivers, car types, 
and fares.64 Sidecar operates in fewer cities than either Uber of Lyft, but 
markets itself based on its greater flexibility and lower prices.  
Finally, it is important to note in describing these ridesharing services 
that there are regional differences in how the businesses are structured. For 
example, commentators have noted regional differences between driving for 
these services in the New York versus the San Francisco market.65 
 
3. Peer-to-Peer Car Rentals 
 
Related to peer-to-peer ride services, the sharing economy has also 
facilitated the emergence of peer-to-peer car rentals, provided by companies 
such as RelayRides, Getaround and Buzzcar.66 Car owners create a car 
profile and manage a calendar to let renters know when the car is available 
for rent and at what rate. Renters enter their travel dates and location details 
and can browse through a selection of vehicles with varying features and 
luxury levels. All of this can be done via smartphone application or through 
the internet. These services offer insurance coverage for rentals. 
RelayRides, for example, covers the car owner for $1,000,000 in liability 
insurance, offers 24/7 customer service, and allows the car owners to 
ultimately decide whether or not they will allow the customer to rent the 
vehicle.67 Getaround also insures rentals up to $1 million.68 If the renter has 
not paid for tickets or tolls during their reservation, RelayRides will 
reimburse the car owner for those charges,69 and has additional policies for 
smoke fees, pet fees, cleaning fees, gas fees and late return fees.70 
In exchange for providing the application or marketplace for these 
rentals, the companies take a percentage of the rental price and additional 
                                                
62 LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/help/article/1003538.  
63 SIDECAR, http://www.side.cr/. 
64 Id. 
65 See, e.g.,  Eric Markowitz, Word on the Street: What My Lyft Drivers Told Me About 
Uber, VOCATIV (Aug. 14, 2014 at 10:11am), http://www.vocativ.com/money/business/lyft-
uber/ (Cab license is required to drive for Lyft and Uber in NY); LYFT, 
https://www.lyft.com/drive/help/article/1695469 (regional variations for Lyft drivers) 
66 RELAYRIDES, https://relayrides.com/; GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/; 
BUZZCAr, http://www.buzzcar.com/en/. 
67 RELAYRIDES, https://relayrides.com/trust-and-safety.  
68 GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com.  
69 RELAYRIDES, http://support.relayrides.com/entries/21078886-What-will-I-earn-
How-do-I-get-paid-. 
70 RELAYRIDES, http://support.relayrides.com/entries/23144270-Fees-Fines. 
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charges. For example, RelayRides car owners receive 75% of the rental 
price and excess mileage charges.71 Like vehicle ridesharing services, peer-
to-peer car rentals allow individuals to share underused vehicles and 
monetize a previously untapped resource. While this Article focuses 
primarily on ridesharing and home sharing, the existence of peer-to-peer 
rentals demonstrates that sharing economy arrangements are heterogeneous, 
and can encompass a number of different service and rental relationships. 
 
B.  Peer-to-Peer Lodging and Accommodation 
 
Like the peer-to-peer transportation services, peer-to-peer marketplaces 
for accommodation, such as Airbnb72 and Roomorama,73 operate 
marketplace platforms that connect landlords (called “hosts” by Airbnb) and 
travelers, enabling these transactions without owning any rooms itself.74 On 
Airbnb, for example, hosts can rent out anything from entire homes, to a 
room in a house, to an air mattress in a living room.75 Hosts decide on the 
price they will charge and manage their own personal rental calendar.76 
Hosts can set custom prices for individual nights and weekends, special 
events, and monthly stays. Renters, either via smartphone application or the 
website, input their travel dates and then can search through host sites based 
upon pricing, location and amenities. Thus, home sharing services allow 
hosts to monetize unutilized space and provide renters a cheaper alternative 
to standard hotel accommodations.77  
Like ridesharing companies, the home sharing companies take a cut of 
the rental payment. On Airbnb, for example, the payout for hosts is the 
listing price minus a 3% host service fee, which Airbnb deducts every time 
a reservation is booked at their website to cover the cost of processing guest 
payments.78 In addition, the guest pays a 6-12% guest service fee79 every 
                                                
71 RELAYRIDES, https://support.relayrides.com/hc/en-us/articles/203992000-What-will-
I-earn-How-do-I-get-paid-.  
72 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/. 
73 ROOMORAMA, https://www.roomorama.com.  
74  Sangeet Paul Choudary, The Airbnb Advantage: How to Avoid Competition and 
become a Multi-billion Dollar Startup, THE NEXT WEB (Mar. 10, 2013 at 5:00pm), 
http://thenextweb.com/insider/2013/03/10/the-airbnb-advantage-how-to-avoid-
competition-and-become-a-multi-billion-dollar-startup/. See also ROOMORAMA, 
https://www.roomorama.com/; WIMDU, http://www.wimdu.com/; BEDYCASA, 
http://www.bedycasa.com/; and HOMEAWAY, http://www.homeaway.com/.  
75 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/5.  
76 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/getting-started/how-to-host. 
77 Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable rise of the Sharing Economy, FORBES 
(Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-
unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/. 
78 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/63.  
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time a reservation is booked. The percentage charged depends on the 
subtotal of the reservation and declines as the reservation amount increases. 
Similar to other economic sharing companies, Airbnb provides insurance to 
hosts,80 a guest refund policy,81 and customer support.82 
 
C.  Other Online Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces for Sharing 
 
Although the focus of this Article is peer-to-peer ride services and 
accommodation rentals, these are just two examples of how the sharing 
economy has grown and developed. With the availability of technology that 
can seamlessly connect peer suppliers and producers, almost anything can 
be shared, and a number of different industries now operate using the 
sharing model to provide a variety of goods.83  
One prominent example, TaskRabbit,84 allows users to outsource 
freelance services to others in their local neighborhood using an online 
marketplace model. Recently, TaskRabbit shifted their business from a 
freewheeling auction model to a more controlled web site.85 Prospective 
employers, or “Clients,” choose from one of four broad categories: 
“Cleaning,” “Handyman,” “Personal Assistance,” and “Moving Help.” 
After this selection, clients receive a choice of a small number of “Taskers” 
with various hourly rates and skill sets. TaskRabbit will let clients set filters 
so that they only receive matches for certain job categories. After a client 
selects a Tasker, the two schedule a time for the job and communicate with 
one another in real time using a custom-messaging platform built by the 
company. In order to select a desired Tasker, clients utilize a user-controlled 
rating system to help make their decision.86 TaskRabbit utilizes a 
transparent system where clients see the hourly rates for the Taskers. 
TaskRabbit requires a minimum payment of one hour per task and a 
                                                                                                                       
79 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/104.  
80 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/937.  
81 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/324.  
82 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/9.  
83 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
84 TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/  
85 Adrienne Raphel, Taskrabbit Redux, NEW YORKER (Jul. 22, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/taskrabbit-redux (describing TaskRabbit’s 
original auction-like model, which “made work look like a game”).  TaskRabbit faced 
significant scrutiny for abandoning its original auction-like bidding system this year. 
Harrison Weber, TaskRabbit Users Revolt as the Company Shuts Down Its Bidding System, 
VENTURE BEAT (Jul. 10, 2014 at 2:34pm), http://venturebeat.com/2014/07/10/taskrabbit-
users-revolt-as-the-company-shuts-down-its-bidding-system/. 
86 The top five per cent of earners with approval ratings of 4.9 out of five get a special 
badge on their profiles and are featured more prominently in search results TASKRABBIT, 
https://www.taskrabbit.com/taskrabbit-elite.  
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Tasker’s rate can never be lower than the highest minimum wage in the 
cities in which TaskRabbit is active. TaskRabbit takes a 20% service fee on 
each task.87 By using TaskRabbit, clients and Taskers receive 24/7 
Members Services support and an insurance policy, which guarantees a 
million dollars of coverage per task.88 
In addition to tasks and chores, the sharing economy has also reached 
numerous other industries, including dog boarding,89 clothing, bicycles, and 
wifi.90 Most of these industries operate on a similar model to ridesharing 
and home sharing: the business creates an online marketplace, bringing 
together consumers and suppliers of the goods or services, and takes a 
percentage commission in exchange for providing the matching platform. 
 
II. TAX ISSUES IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 
 
We now turn to examining the substantive and doctrinal tax issues 
raised by sharing, focusing on the ridesharing and home sharing sectors. 
Commentators have claimed that tax issues and uncertainties abound for 
those earning income in the sharing economy.91 In Parts II and III, we 
closely examine whether and in what respects these claims are accurate. We 
find that while they may be complicated, significant portions of the 
doctrinal tax rules governing the tax liability of sharing economy earners 
are not unclear. More importantly, these rules are generally adequate to tax 
sharing. In a few respects, particularly employment taxes and local 
occupancy taxes, the applicable law is less clear. But the conceptual 
framework and categories of current tax law should be appropriate once 
clarification is provided regarding the law’s application. In short, perhaps in 
contrast to other regulatory spheres, fundamental substantive overhaul or 
introduction of new rules is not required. On the other hand, as further 
discussed in Part III, the sharing economy may raise fresh issues with 
respect to tax compliance.92  
The tax issues at stake in the sharing economy vary depending on 
industry, and contextualized study is required. For example, home sharing 
may implicate the I.R.C. § 280A limitations, while ridesharing may require 
use of the standard mileage expense method.93 Thus, for clarity, we discuss 
ridesharing and home sharing separately, in Parts II.A and II.B respectively. 
                                                
87 TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/how-it-works.  
88 Id.  
89 See DOGVACAY, http://dogvacay.com/; ROVER, http://www.rover.com/. 
90 See supra note 26. 
91 See sources cited supra note 7. 
92 See infra Part III.  
93 See infra Part II.A.2 and B.2. 
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In Part II.C we flag those areas—employment and local occupancy taxes—
in which there may be uncertainty in determining which rule applies, while 
re-emphasizing that the rules themselves are quite clear and the concepts 
and categories of tax law remain sufficient. 
 
A.  Income Taxation of Peer-to-Peer Ride Services 
 
The tax rules that govern ridesharing can broadly be divided into three 
groups: (1) general rules for income inclusion and deduction; (2) rules 
governing apportionment of expenses between business and personal uses; 
and (3) self-employment tax rules. We show in Part II.A that the rules in the 
first two groups may be complex but are for the most part clear. We discuss 
the third group of rules in Part II.C. 
 
1. General Rules for Income Inclusion and Deduction 
 
The clear doctrinal rule is that ridesharing drivers are taxed on a net 
basis on their income earned from driving activities minus allowable 
expenses.94 Conceptually, this tax treatment is not unlike that of other 
business income earners operating as independent contractors. Income 
sources for ridesharing drivers will include the gross fares received as well 
as any additional tips received. They may also include referral and other 
bonuses, driver credits and other such payments from the ridesharing 
services themselves. Expenses may include gas, amounts paid for vehicle 
repairs, and driving insurance. Ridesharing drivers may be subject to certain 
documentation requirements and other limitations in their ability to deduct 
expenses.95 
As further discussed below, drivers may choose to either deduct actual 
expenses or use the standard mileage method.96 
 
2. Apportionment of Expenses between Business and Personal Use 
 
While the general scheme for taxing income and expenses is clear, 
complexities may arise in the ridesharing sector because many ridesharing 
                                                
94 See I.R.C. §§ 61, 162, 212. 
95 Business deductions under I.R.C. § 162 must meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 
274(d), which dictates that listed property must meet certain documentation requirements. 
Listed property, includes: (1) passenger automobiles, and (2) any other property used as a 
means of transportation unless substantially all the use is for the business of providing 
unrelated persons services consisting of the transportation of persons or property for 
compensation or hire. I.R.C. § 280F(d)(4)(C). 
96 See infra text accompanying note 104. 
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drivers do not drive full-time.97 Furthermore, the vehicle they use for 
ridesharing may also be driven for personal use, sometimes predominantly 
for personal use.98 Thus, because the tax law only permits deduction of 
business-related expenses, ridesharing drivers may face more significant 
expense allocation and tracking issues than taxicab drivers.  
Most but not all expenses of ridesharing drivers will pertain to the 
vehicle they operate. Vehicle-related expense identification and tracking 
may be done using two methods: Drivers may either (1) deduct the actual 
business expenses that they incur or (2) they may use the standard mileage 
method.99  
Actual Costs Method. If the driver uses “actual costs,” the relevant 
covered expenses include: “depreciation, garage rent, gas, insurance, lease 
payments, licenses, oil, parking fees, registration, repairs, tires, and tolls.”100  
If the vehicle serves both personal and business use, then the taxpayer 
driver must apportion these expenses between the business and the personal 
use. Such apportionment may be based on miles driven. The driver must 
keep track of personal use miles and business miles and track all qualified 
actual expenses (the listed expenses above). These actual expenses are then 
divided based on mileage, with the business portion deductible.101 For 
example, if two-thirds of the miles driven in the vehicle are business use 
(e.g., driving with Uber) then two-thirds of the actual expenses of operating 
the vehicle may be deducted against the Uber business income. The 
remaining one-third of expenses allocated to personal use would not be 
deductible.102 For vehicles for which business use does not exceed 50%, 
                                                
97 A study commissioned by Uber and conducted by the Benenson Strategy Group 
found that, based on interviews conducted in December 2014, 52% of “partner-drivers” 
driving with Uber were part-time drivers with no previous driving experience who drove 
fewer than 30 hours a week. Benenson Strategy Group, Uber the Driver Road Map (2015) 
at http://www.bsgco.com/insights/uber-the-driver-roadmap; see also UBER, 
http://blog.uber.com/partner-experience  [hereinafter Uber Study] (describing the decision 
to commission the study and outlining some of the findings).  
98 The typical Uber driver is using his or her own car. See UBER, blog.Uber.com 
(requirements include a 4-door vehicle model year 2005 or later). As noted, other Uber 
services coordinate with local licensed livery and taxicab services. See, e.g., UBERTAXI, at 
Uber.com. See also UBER, http://blog.uber.com/2012/07/03/choice-is-a-beautiful-thing/ 
(riders in Chicago are able to hail and automatically pay for a taxicab using the UberTAXI 
app); UBER, https://partners.uber.com/signup/san_francisco/ (vehicles under the UberTAXI 
program in San Francisco are commercial taxis driven by an individual licensed and 
certified by the city of San Francisco). 
99 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(j)(2). Notice 2014-79 (Sec.3), 2014-53 I.R.B. 1001; IRS News 
Release 2014-114. 
100 IRS Publication 463 “Travel, Entertainment, Gift, and Car Expenses” (2013) at 17. 
See also Rev. Proc. 2010-51. 
101 See Pub. 463, supra note 100. 
102 Id. at 17. 
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ridesharing drivers may be forced to use the alternative depreciation system, 
rather than MACRS depreciation, and may not be able to make the I.R.C. § 
179 election to expense certain car costs.103   
Standard Mileage Method. On the other hand, if the driver uses the 
standard mileage rate, she must still keep track of the number of miles she 
drives for business, and can deduct a certain number of cents per mile 
driven.104 For 2015, the allowable standard mileage deduction is 57.5 cents 
per mile.105 If the driver uses standard mileage, then she cannot deduct her 
actual car expenses (e.g., lease payments, maintenance, repairs, gasoline, 
oil, insurance, vehicle registration).106 The standard mileage rate cannot be 
used in certain circumstances.107 For example, standard mileage may not be 
used if the taxpayer has claimed depreciation deductions with respect to the 
car using a method other than straight line for the car’s useful life, or if the 
taxpayer has taken MACRS depreciation under I.R.C. § 168 or bonus 
depreciation under I.R.C. § 168(k) with respect to that automobile.108 
Generally, this means that the taxpayer cannot switch to the standard 
mileage method after having used actual operating costs.109 
While automobile costs will likely constitute the dominant business 
expenses of ridesharing drivers, other costs may be incurred. For example, a 
ridesharing driver might decide to buy water and candy bars for passengers, 
in order to boost her driver rating.110 Such costs might be deductible 
regardless of whether the driver has selected the standard mileage rate 
method or the actual costs method, but the outlays would have to satisfy the 
                                                
103 I.R.C. § 280F; Pub. 463, supra note 100. 
104 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(j)(2). Notice 2014-79, supra note 99; IRS News Release 
2014-114.  To use standard mileage, that method must be chosen in the first year the car is 
used in the business. The operator may switch to the actual expenses method in subsequent 
years. For a car that is leased, if a driver uses the standard mileage rate, that method must 
be used for the entire lease period (including renewals). 
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc510.html. Other restrictions apply to the use of the standard 
mileage rate. See also Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-2 C.B. 883; Pub. 463, supra note 100 at 
16-23. 
105 Notice 2014-79, supra note 99; IRS News Release 2014-114.   
106 Rev. Proc. 2010-5, supra note 104, at Sec. 4; Publication 463, supra note 100 at 16. 
107 Pub. 463, supra note 100, at 16 (standard mileage cannot be used if you (1) use five 
or more cars at the same time (such as in fleet operations), (2) claimed a depreciation 
deduction for the car using any method other than straight line, for example, MACRS, (3) 
claimed an I.R.C. § 179 deduction on the car (4) claimed the special depreciation 
allowance on the car, (5) claimed actual car expenses after 1997 for a car you leased, or (5) 
are a rural mail carrier who received a qualified reimbursement.  
108 Rev. Proc. 2010-51, supra note 104. 
109 RIA Checkpoint Federal Tax Coordinator Analysis at ¶ L-1903 (RIA Caution). 
110  Jeff Bercovici, Uber's Ratings Terrorize Drivers And Trick Riders. Why Not 
Fix Them? (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2014/08/14/what-
are-we-actually-rating-when-we-rate-other-people/.  
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deductibility requirements of the relevant statutes.111 As another example, 
ridesharing drivers must generally use a smartphone as part of their driving 
business. Due to the potential constraints in trying to deduct expenses for a 
phone used partially for business and partially for person use, at least one 
commentator has urged drivers to buy a separate phone used exclusively for 
their ridesharing business to ensure the full deductibility of their ridesharing 
phone costs.112 The existence of these additional costs means that even use 
of the streamlined standard mileage rate method would not obviate the need 
for detailed record keeping. Also, at the margins, the business-personal 
distinction may become less clear, and there could be a question as to 
whether these additional expenses satisfy both I.R.C. § 162 (general 
deductibility of business expenses) and § 274 (further limits on the 
deductibility of otherwise §162-qualified business expenses).113  
To be clear, we do not claim that the tax law and reporting as applied to 
ridesharing drivers is not complex. Drivers may have to undertake 
significant tracking and reporting burdens regarding their income and 
expenses. Furthermore, apportionment between business and personal uses 
of a vehicle may further increase compliance costs. Complexity and 
administrability concerns may suggest that reform is required. Our point, 
rather, is that for the most part, the ridesharing sector does not raise new 
issues requiring significant new rules, even if their factual realities 
exacerbate some issues currently confronting the taxing authority and tax 
filers. In general, tax laws already have the doctrines and structures in place 
that are necessary to regulate the new filers from the ridesharing sector.114 
 
B.  Income Taxation of Home Sharing 
 
Home sharing implicates some of the same tax issues as ridesharing, but 
                                                
111 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2010-51, supra note 104, at sec. 4.03 (noting that even if 
standard mileage method is selected, taxpayer may also deduct, as separate expenses, items 
such as parking fees and tolls); I.R.C. §§ 162, 274. 
112 See, e.g., RIDESHAREDASHBOARD, 
http://ridesharedashboard.com/2014/01/28/salary-and-tax-rates-for-uber-and-lyft-drivers/ 
(“it is recommended you get another mobile phone with data just for Lyft, Uber and 
Sidecar so you can deduct the entire phone bill, or you will need to itemize how much for 
personal use or business purposes”). 
113 Although not a likely risk for services like Uber, Lyft and Sidecar, there is a 
possibility that in other less commercially structured variants, the IRS might deny losses on 
the ground that the activities are hobbies rather than part-time businesses. See, e.g., 
Homobiles: Transportation with a Social Mission, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, October 5, 
2014, available at npr.org. (Describing a “non commercial, volunteer, 24/7 ride service for 
the LGBT community and others around San Francisco”). 
114 Other commentators have explored potential I.R.C. § 132 questions. See Barry & 
Caron, supra note 12. 
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there are some important differences as well. The main issues with respect 
to home sharing are: (1) the doctrinal rules governing income inclusions and 
deductions; (2) issues that arise in allocating expenses between business and 
personal; and (3) state and local occupancy taxes. It is possible that some 
home sharing hosts may encounter self-employment tax issues (for 
example, if they are found to be operating a full-service bed and breakfast 
equivalent), but this is generally less likely than in the ridesharing sector. 
Again, we argue that despite complexities surrounding business-personal 
allocations, the substance of the federal income tax law is quite clear. With 
respect to state and local occupancy taxes, the application of these taxes to 
home sharing may be slightly more ambiguous, even though the rules 
themselves are not unclear.115 
 
1. General Rules for Income Inclusions and Deductions 
 
Home sharing hosts must include rents received in gross income and 
may deduct qualified deductions in computing net taxable income. 
However, the sharing element of home sharing may give rise to 
complications less present in traditional real estate rentals. An important 
concern is the risk that expense deductions will be limited by I.R.C. § 280A. 
The provision was enacted to police the business-personal borderline by 
imposing limitations on a taxpayer’s deductions in connection with rental of 
a “dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable year as a 
residence.”116 However, to the extent home sharing deductions are not 
limited by I.R.C. § 280A, taxpayers can proceed to make a standard 
business expense analysis and report all otherwise qualified deductions on 
their tax returns.117 
In the most straightforward case, property used exclusively for business 
purposes (including home sharing rentals) and not for any personal 
purposes would not trigger the application of I.R.C. § 280A. Such exclusive 
business-use property might include, for example, a separate apartment with 
its own kitchen and toilet. It might also include a portion of the taxpayer’s 
residence that itself constitutes a separate “dwelling unit” within the 
meaning of I.R.C. §280A (such as a basement apartment with its own 
kitchen and toilet).118 For these properties, taxpayers would not need to 
allocate expenses between personal and business use. On the other hand, 
                                                
115 See infra Part II.C.2. 
116 I.R.C. § 280A(a). 
117 Rental expenses on generally reported on I.R.S. Schedule E (Form 1040). 
118 Prop. Reg. § 1.280A-1(c)(1). I.R.C. § 280A defines a “dwelling unit” 
as a property that contains basic living accommodations, such as sleeping space, toilet, and 
cooking facilities. I.R.C. § 280A(f)(1). 
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taxpayers would still need to determine which costs are currently deducted 
and which must be capitalized. It seems likely, however, that a significant 
number of home sharing landlords will have property with respect to which 
there is personal use.119 In that case, the I.R.C. § 280A limitations would 
apply.120 
 
2. Expense Limitations Associated with Partial Business-Use Property 
 
Significant complexities may arise in home sharing rentals of properties 
where there is also some personal use by the taxpayer. There is reason to 
think that these mixed-use properties may be a significant portion of home 
sharing rentals.121 In the case of such properties, the following rules may 
limit the taxpayer’s ability to deduct home sharing expenses. 
 
a. The “Hotel” Exception 
 
Taxpayers may be able to participate in home sharing without being 
subject to the I.R.C. § 280A limitations on deductions associated with 
dwelling units if the property falls under the so-called “hotel exception.” 
That exception provides that the term “dwelling unit” “does not include that 
portion of a unit used exclusively as a hotel, motel, inn, or similar 
establishment.”122 A room in a home is considered so used if it is “regularly 
available for occupancy by paying customers and only if no person having 
an interest in the property is deemed under the rules of this section to have 
used the unit as a residence during the taxable year.”123 So, for example, a 
taxpayer who rents a room in her home for short-term occupancy to paying 
                                                
119 For example, Airbnb encourages prospective “hosts” to consider “rent[ing] out 
extra space effortlessly.”  AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/info/why_host. The Airbnb site 
also lists the possibility of offering “an air mattress in the corner of your living room.” An 
October 2013 NYC Airbnb study found that 87% of hosts rent out the property where they 
actually live. See AIRBNB, http://blog.airbnb.com/wp-content/uploads/Airbnb-economic-
impact-study-New-York-City.pdf (hereinafter Airbnb Study); AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/press/news/new-study-airbnb-generated-632-million-in-economic-
activity-in-new-york; see also AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/getting-started/how-
to-host. 
120 Neither I.R.C. § 280A(c)(3) and (5) (limiting rental expense deductions where the 
rented dwelling unit is used by the taxpayer as a residence), nor § 280A(e) (requiring 
apportioning expenses between rental activity and personal use (including use as a 
residence) would be relevant in the case of exclusive rental of property with no personal 
use of any type. 
121 Airbnb Study, supra note 119. 
122 I.R.C. § 280A(f)(1)(B). 
123 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-1(c)(2). See, e.g., IRS Publication 527 (2013) 
“Residential Rental Property” at 17. 
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guests and who does not use the room herself might be able to avoid the 
limitations of I.R.C. § 280A, if it were determined that the room falls under 
the hotel exception. In such case, however, costs associated with common 
spaces and the building exterior, and not related to the business, cannot be 
deducted.124   
Hosts in the home sharing economy face several challenges in trying to 
fall under the hotel exception. The most obvious is the factual question of 
whether the identified room is regularly available for occupancy and 
whether there is personal use of the room by the taxpayer.125 So, for 
example, hosts who rent out a couch or an air mattress in the living room 
will be unlikely to qualify for the hotel exception. Similarly, taxpayers who 
rent out a spare room, but also use the room for personal purposes when not 
rented, would likely not qualify. Even for those taxpayers who reserve a 
room in their home solely for rental use, the ability to qualify for the “hotel 
exception” may be hampered by the distinctive operational features of this 
rental economy. For example, to the extent that Airbnb hosts have the right 
to screen, monitor and evaluate potential renters, the room might not be 
considered “regularly available for occupancy by paying customers” in a 
manner comparable to hotels, motels and inns.126 
If the taxpayer’s room rental falls within the hotel exception, then the 
general rules for income and deduction where there is no personal use apply 
irrespective of I.R.C. § 280A.127 The taxpayer must divide expenses 
between the rental use portion of the property and the personal use portion 
of the property and may only deduct on Schedule E the rental use portion. 
“Any reasonable method” may be used to divide expenses between rental 
and personal.128 Certain allowable personal use expenses may continue to 
be deducted on Schedule A.129 
                                                
124 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8732002 (Apr. 2, 1987). 
125 Case law and ruling suggests that the “used … as a residence” requirement is 
interpreted narrowly and that any personal use of the space by taxpayer will take it outside 
of the hotel exception. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8518003 (Jan. 18, 1985); Byers v. 
Commissioner, 82 TC 919 (1984); Fine v. US, 493 F. Supp. 540 (ND Ill 1980), aff’d 647 
F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1981); Grigg v. Commissioner, 62 TCM 465 (1991), aff’d 979 F. 2d 383 
(5th Cir 1992).  
126 See, e.g., AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/899 (“you can tell any guest 
that your listing is unavailable for a trip they’ve asked about.”). See also AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/259 (“If a guest sends you a booking inquiry or 
reservation request and you find that they’re not a fit for your space or hosting style, you 
are free to decline the booking.”). 
127 I.R.C. §§ 61, 162, 212, 183. 
128 IRS Publication 587 “Business Use of Your Home” (2013) at 10 (square footage or  
number of rooms, where rooms are all about the same size, are two commonly used 
methods). 
129 For example, home mortgage interest may be deducted. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3).  
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b. Partial Rental Use of a Dwelling Unit that Does Not Rise to the 
Level of a Residence 
 
If a taxpayer rents out property that is considered a “dwelling unit” 
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 280A but is not exclusively for business use, 
then I.R.C. § 280A applies. This scenario would arise, for example, if the 
taxpayer has a condominium that she rents out at fair rental value for most 
of the year but uses for personal purposes for some days. In such scenarios 
where there is partial personal use, two outcomes are possible. 
First, to the extent the level of personal use does not rise to that of a 
“residence,” the less restrictive portion of the I.R.C. § 280A rules apply. 
Personal use will only arise to the level of a “residence” if the use is (1) 
more than 14 days or (2) 10% of the number of days for which the unit is 
rented at fair rental.130 If the personal use does not rise to the level of 
“residence,” the taxpayer’s deduction for expenses attributable to the rental 
of the unit is limited to Y, where131 
 
Y =  taxpayer’s total rental expenses         X   number of days in the year the unit is rented at fair value  
total number of days in the year the unit is used  
 
Thus, consider a case in which a home sharing host rents a unit to 
various guests for 50 weeks in a year and uses it personally for one week. If 
the total expenses associated with the unit were $10,000 for the year, the 
rule provides the deductible expenses may not exceed $9,804.132 
 
c. Partial Rental Use of a Dwelling Unit that is Used as a Residence 
 
Second, if the level of personal use does rise to the level of a 
“residence,” then the more extensive rules of I.R.C. § 280A apply. This 
situation might exist if, for example, the rented space is a “dwelling unit” 
and the personal use of that space exceeds the threshold for being a 
residence noted above.133 If the taxpayer uses the dwelling unit as a 
residence and rented it out for 15 days or more during the year, then the 
taxpayer must report the income and expenses (including depreciation) 
allocable to rental use on Schedule E, subject to the I.R.C. § 280A 
                                                
130 I.R.C. § 280A(d)(1). 
131 I.R.C. § 280A(e)(1). This ratio-based limitation does not apply to deduction of 
expenses that would be deductible regardless of whether the unit (or portion thereof) was 
rented. I.R.C. § 280A(e)(2). 
132 Because $10,000 x 350/357 days = $9,804. 
133 See sources cited supra note 130. 
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limitations.134  
Specifically, I.R.C. § 280A limits the rental deductions attributable to 
the rental unit to the amount of gross income from the rental activity that 
remains after deducting (1) expenses allocable to the rental activity that 
would be deductible regardless of the rental use, and (2) expenses allocable 
to the rental business but not to the rental property itself. So, for example, 
assume that taxpayer rents out her condominium for 4 weeks and lives in it 
the remaining 48 weeks of the year.135 She earns total rental income of 
$5,000, incurs $2,000 of expenses that would be deductible regardless of 
the rental activity (e.g., property tax) and incurs $400 of expenses related to 
the rental activity but not to the unit (e.g., a fee to list the property on a 
home sharing website). Under I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5), the taxpayer is limited 
to a deduction of $4,446.58 for the expenses attributable to the rental unit 
use but not otherwise deductible (e.g., utilities, insurance, repairs).136 
Expenses over this limitation may be carried over to the next taxable 
year.137  
To take another example, assume that taxpayer rents out a room in her 
home on Airbnb for 4 weeks a year but uses it for the remaining 48 weeks 
for personal purposes. Assume taxpayer earns $2,000 of rental income. 
Assume that the taxpayer has total annual mortgage interest of $15,000 and 
total property tax liability of $11,000. The portion of mortgage interest 
related to the rental is $1,200 and the portion of property tax related to the 
rental is $880.138 Under these facts, the taxpayer would be able to take zero 
deduction for rental expenses attributable to the rental unit but not otherwise 
deductible (e.g., utilities, insurance) because her gross income from home 
sharing is less than the deductions otherwise allowable by the statute 
(mortgage interest and property tax). 
                                                
134 I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5), and § 280A(e)(i). If the taxpayer used the dwelling unit as a 
residence and rented it for fewer than 15 days during the year, then the taxpayer reports 
neither income nor expenses associated with the rental activity. I.R.C. §§ 280A(c)(5), (g). 
135 I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5). 
136 The property is rented for 28 of the 365 days it is used this year. Thus, deductible 
rental-related expenses of the property cannot exceed 28/365. Of the $2000 in property 
taxes, $153.42 is attributable to the rental (the remaining $1846.58 is deductible regardless 
of rental use). To determine the amount of rental unit expenses deductible (other than those 
such as interest or taxes which are independently deductible) I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5) specifies 
the following calculation: $5,000 rental income – $153.42 (otherwise permitted property 
deductions, here the portion of property tax) – $400 (rental expenses not related to the 
property, here the listing fee) = maximum of other rental unit costs allowed as deduction. If 
the taxpayer’s deductions exceed this annually calculated limit, the taxpayer may carryover 
the unused amounts, subject to some limitations. See Pub.  527, supra note 123 at 11; Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-3(d). 
137 I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5).  
138 Calculated as 28/365 x $15,000= $1200 and 28/365 x $11,000= $880. 
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* * * 
 
In sum, the doctrinal tax rules governing income inclusion and expense 
taking in both ridesharing and home sharing are not unclear. These rules, 
which have long applied to other small business persons or landlords, have 
equal application in the sharing economy. On the other hand, these rules 
may be complex, and the structure of the sharing economy may exacerbate 
their complexities and may create compliance difficulties for tax return 
filers and enforcement difficulties for taxing authorities. We discuss some 
of these compliance concerns at greater length in Part III. It is important to 
note for now, however, that complexities in the law are not the same as 
saying that the tax law does not having an adequate framework for taxing 
sharing. While they may be less than ideal, the legal rules and frameworks 
are not inadequate. 
 
C.  Self-Employment Taxes and Local Occupancy Taxes 
 
With respect to federal self-employment taxes and local occupancy 
taxes, the application of the law may be less clear than for federal income 
taxes. Yet, even here, the tax rules are not inadequate. The ambiguity lies in 
the question of whether an existing regime applies to sharing.  
 
1. Self-Employment Taxes 
 
One point of ambiguity is whether sharing economy workers are 
independent contractors who are responsible for paying self-employment 
taxes. This is more of a concern for ridesharing drivers and other task 
workers, although the issue may arise for some home sharing landlords as 
well.139  
The doctrinal rules regarding how self-employment taxes apply to 
independent contractors are well established. Essentially, sharing economy 
earners who are independent contractors would be subject to the same rules 
that apply to independent contractors in other industries. Amounts earned 
by such self-employed independent contractors will be subject to self-
employment taxes (i.e., social security and Medicare tax at a 15.3% rate), 
which the individual will have to pay by filing Schedule SE.140 The 
                                                
139 See Lauren Weber, On-demand Workers: We Are Not Robots, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 
2015 at 7:55pm), http://www.wsj.com/article_email/on-demand-workers-we-are-not-
robots-1422406524-lMyQjAxMTE1NDI2ODYyNjgwWj.  
140 See generally IRS Self-Employed Individuals Tax Center, 
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Self-Employed#obligations. For 2014, the 15.3% self- 
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individual can then deduct half of these taxes on Form 1040, line 27.141 
Because they are independent contractors not subject to withholding, such 
individuals may also have to pay estimated taxes, depending on their overall 
tax situation.142   
What is less clear, however, is whether sharing economy workers are, in 
fact, independent contractors. As discussed in more detail in Part III, most 
sharing businesses, including the ridesharing businesses, have taken the 
position that sharing workers are independent contractors rather than 
employees.143 However, the rules for distinguishing employees from 
independent contractors are complex.144 The IRS has developed a 20-factor 
test to distinguish independent contractors from employees, and courts have 
considered a number of these factors in classifying workers.145 In brief, the 
IRS and courts will normally look at a variety of behavioral, financial, and 
relational factors to distinguish employees from independent contractors.146  
Very generally, a worker is an independent contractor if the business paying 
                                                                                                                       
employment tax reflects a social security tax component of 12.4% and a Medicare tax of 
2.9%. I.R.C. § 1401(a), (b)(1). The additional Medicare tax introduced in 2013 imposes an 
additional 0.9% tax for compensation including self-employment income above a threshold 
amount.  I.R.C. § 1401(b)(2). 
141  I.R.C. § 164(f)(1), and Instructions to IRS Form 1040 (2014) at 30. Thus, drivers 
include their net driving income and a deduction for half of the self-employment taxes on 
Form 1040 along with any other taxable income. 
142  I.R.C. § 6654(a), (d); see also IRS Publication 505, Tax Withholding and 
Estimated Tax, available at www.http//IRS.gov (discussing circumstances under which 
estimated tax payments are required). 
143 See UBER, https://support.uber.com/hc/en-us/articles/201955457-Who-are-the-
drivers-on-the-Uber-system- (stating that “Uber’s technology connects people with cars to 
people who need rides, meaning drivers on the Uber system are independent contractors.”). 
See also Uber Terms and Conditions available at UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms (last updated November 10, 2014) (“The Services 
constitute a technological platform that enables users of Uber’s mobile applications or 
websites provided as part of the Services (each, an “Application”) to arrange and schedule 
transportation and/or logistics services with third party providers and third party logistics 
providers under agreement with Uber or certain Uber subsidiaries.”). Uber sends drivers a 
Form 1099, rather than the Form W-2 used for employees. See UBER, 
https://get.uber.com/drive-
uber/boston/p2p/?utm_source=bsbanneronline&utm_campaign=boston (“We’ll send you a 
1099 form that you will use to report the income you made driving with Uber.”). 
144 See Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Employers Do Not Always 
Follow Internal Revenue Service Worker Determination Ruling, (June 14, 2013), Ref. 
No.:2013-30-058 at 2 (“IRS estimates that employers misclassify millions of workers as 
independent contractors instead of employees. . . . allow[ing] employers to avoid paying a 
significant amount of money in employment taxes”). 
145 Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296; Levine v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2005-86; 
Schramm v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2011-212. 
146 This is often called the 20-factor test. 
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the worker has the right to control or direct only the result of the work and 
not what will be done and how.147  
Because of the unique structures of the sharing economy, some have 
argued that it is unclear whether sharing workers should be classified as 
independent contractors or employees, and the issue is a contested and 
unresolved one.148 For example, a number of lawsuits have been filed 
arguing that Uber drivers are employees rather than independent 
contractors.149 If ridesharing drivers are found to be employees, then 
responsibility for collecting the Medicare and Social Security taxes would 
rest with the ridesharing businesses themselves not the individual drivers. 
Payments to the drivers would be subject to wage withholding, and not just 
information reporting. 
Again, it is important to reiterate that the tax law itself is not necessarily 
inadequate as applied to sharing.150 The question is how sharing economy 
workers fit into the employee vs. independent contractor distinction created 
by the law. That question is open but ultimately resolvable. 
 
2. State and Local Hotel Occupancy Taxes 
 
Another issue that has confronted home sharing businesses and earners 
is the question of whether hosts are liable for various state and local 
occupancy taxes, room taxes, or hotel taxes when they rent out properties or 
rooms, and if so, who is responsible for collecting and paying over the 
tax.151 Such occupancy taxes are imposed on rentals (usually short-term 
                                                
147 IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-
Employed/Independent-Contractor-Defined.   
148 Weber, supra note 139. 
149 Douglas O’Connor, et al. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., et al., Case number: 
4:2013cv03826, filed August 16, 2013 (N.D. California); Hakan Yucesoy v. Uber 
Technologies, Inc., Travis Kalanick, and Ryan Graves, Case number: 14-0576 C, filed June 
26, 2014 (Mass. Superior Ct.); see also Ang Jiang Liu et al. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 
Case number: CGC 14 536979, filed January 27, 2014 (San Francisco); Claire Fahrbach v. 
Djamol Gafurov, et al, Case number: CGC 13 533103, filed July 23, 2013 (Superior Ct. of 
California, SF County). For summaries of Uber litigation see, e.g., COMMUNITY 
ENTERPRISE LAW.ORG, http://communityenterpriselaw.org/independent-contractors/; 
http://uberlawsuit.com; Weber, supra note 139. 
150 But see Lauren Weber, What If There Were A New Type of Worker? Dependent 
Contractor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015, at 10:28am), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-
there-were-a-new-type-of-worker-dependent-contractor-1422405831 (advocating a third, 
dependent contractor classification in the labor protection context). 
151 See, e.g., Office of the New York State Attorney General, “AirBNB in the city” 
(October 2014) at 9 and Appendix A, available at 
www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf; see also AIRBNB 
https://AirBNB.com/help/article/481 (noting that occupancy taxes may apply to rental of 
rooms and noting that generally it is the host’s decision and role to collect these taxes 
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rentals) of hotel rooms, on a per night basis.152 For example, San 
Francisco’s transient occupancy tax is approximately 14%.153 The 
occupancy tax issue actually encompasses a number of separate issues, 
including: (1) whether the transaction gives rise to the occupancy tax at all, 
(2) if so, whether the guest, the host, or the home sharing business itself 
(i.e., Airbnb) is responsible for collecting and paying over the tax, and (3) 
relatedly, how the tax should be priced or presented to the guest as part of 
the total rental price.   
These questions have been under dispute with a number of state and 
local regulators, and the answers and approaches have varied based on 
locality.154 In some localities, Airbnb has conceded that the rentals are 
subject to the local hotel and occupancy tax, and has agreed to collect and 
pay over the tax.155 Although various state regulators had taken the position 
that Airbnb rentals were basically hotel rooms, Airbnb had initially resisted 
that characterization, and Airbnb hosts had, for the most part, not been 
collecting and paying over these taxes.156 This situation created both a 
substantive and an enforcement issue. The substantive issue was whether 
Airbnb rentals were in fact hotel rooms subject to the occupancy tax. 
Assuming the answer to the substantive law question was “yes,” an 
enforcement problem arose because of the difficulty in tracking down 
individual hosts to enforce compliance. Anecdotally, it seems that very few 
hosts actually complied with such hotel tax payment obligations.157 Airbnb 
had initially taken the credible position that it does not own the rooms being 
rented, but functions merely as a go-between and thus is not liable for 
collecting (and in some instances is not allowed to collect) the hotel tax.158  
                                                                                                                       
except in locations where Airbnb has “made agreements with government officials to 
collect and remit local taxes on behalf of hosts”). 
152 See, e.g., Massachusetts Room Occupancy Tax 
http://www.mass.gov/dor/businesses/current-tax-info/guide-to-employer-tax-
obligations/trustee-and-excise-taxes-requiring-registration/room-occupancy-tax.html 
(imposed on rent received from an individual occupying “the lodgings for 90 consecutive 
days or less”). 
153 San Francisco Business and Tax Regulations, Art. 7, 1.504-1. 
154 See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Airbnb’s Woes Show How Far the Sharing Economy Has 
Come, TIME TECHN. & MEDIA (October 7, 2013), 
http://business.time.com/2013/10/07/airbnbs-woes-show-how-far-the-sharing-economy-
has-come/. 
155 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/653.  
156 Said, supra note 11. 
157 See, e.g., Tuttle, supra note 7; Steven Jones, Airbnb isn’t sharing, SAN FRAN. BAY 
GUARD. ONLINE (March 19, 2013 at 3:54pm), http://www.sfbg.com/2013/03/19/airbnb-
isnt-sharing. In the traditional hotel context, the hotel collects the tax on its rooms and 
remits the tax to the government. 
158 Airbnb’s position had been that it operated a new form of economic activity not 
covered by traditional regulations. Even when Airbnb has agreed to facilitate the collection 
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However, facing potential enactment of less favorable regulatory 
regimes, Airbnb eventually conceded that Airbnb rentals may be subject to 
the hotel tax and has agreed in certain cities (Multnomah County and 
Portland, Oregon, San Francisco, San Jose, Chicago, and Washington DC) 
to act as a collection agent for those taxes owed by the hosts.159 In these 
cities, Airbnb is now collecting the tax from renters and paying them over 
to the cities. Thus, even though the business structure of the Airbnb model 
differs from traditional hotels, the net result in some localities has been the 
creation of a de facto withholding-agent obligation (in some instances, the 
locality has actually changed the regulations to do this) imposed on Airbnb 
to facilitate otherwise near-impossible compliance. 
Again, however, it is important to note that what is unclear is how the 
hotel and occupancy taxes should apply to home sharing businesses and 
who should collect the tax. These questions depend on whether the home 
sharing rentals are equivalent to hotel rooms. This issue is contested, but 
clarification is possible within the parameters of current law.  
 
III. TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES IN THE SHARING 
SECTOR: OPPORTUNISM AND MICROBUSINESS 
 
While the tax rules that apply to sharing are not fundamentally unclear, 
nor particularly novel, tax compliance and enforcement may present 
distinctive challenges due to two intersecting features of the sharing 
economy. First, in determining how and whether to comply with existing 
laws and regulations, sharing economy businesses have the propensity to 
pick the more favorable regime if there is any ambiguity as to which regime 
applies. We call this behavior “tax opportunism.” Second, many sharing 
                                                                                                                       
and remission of these taxes, it continued to maintain that it really was not obligated. See, 
e.g., Kopytoff, supra note 154 (while Airbnb’s earlier position was that hotel taxes did not 
apply to its model, its CEO Brian Chesky has conceded that  “We believe it makes sense 
for our community of hosts to pay occupancy tax to the cities in which they live, with 
exceptions under certain thresholds, and we are eager to discuss how this might be made 
possible”); see also Sarah Buhr, Brian Chesky Talks About Just How Different The Hotel 
Business Is From Airbnb (Sept. 9, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/09/09/brian-chesky-
hotels-and-airbnb-are-the-same-but-different/ (quoting Chesky’s inconsistent position on 
whether Airbnb is a hotel); Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Airbnb Pays Tax Bill of “Tens 
of Millions” to S.F., SFGATE (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-
ross/article/M-R-Airbnb-pays-tens-of-millions-in-back-6087802.php (noting Airbnb’s 
“concerns” about San Francisco’s assessment of back taxes). 
159 See Ben Trefny, Airbnb to Start Charging Hotel Taxes in a Handful of Cities, NPR 
(April 18, 2014), at  
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/04/18/304564169/airbnb-to-start-
charging-hotel-taxes-in-a-handful-of-cities;  Kate Rogers, San Francisco moves closer to 
legalizing Airbnb, CNBC (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102102286. 
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earners may earn relatively small income amounts, may use otherwise 
personal property for business purposes, and may be filing and reporting 
independent contractor business income for the first time. The confluence of 
these two realities—tax opportunism and the microbusiness characteristics 
of sharing—may present challenges in ensuring that sharing earners are 
complying with the tax laws. However, the precise nature of those 
challenges should be clarified through further empirical study.  
In this Part, we describe in greater detail the existence and impact of 
these two realities in the sharing economy. In Parts III.A and III.B, we 
discuss the concept of tax opportunism and delineate four examples of the 
phenomenon: (a) the decision by certain sharing businesses to classify 
themselves as third party settlement organizations for purposes of the 
information reporting rules; (b) the sharing businesses’ affirmative adoption 
of independent contractor classification for all drivers and hosts, rather than 
employee classification; (c) Airbnb’s decision out of the gate not to collect 
local hotel or occupancy taxes; and (d) the decision by ridesharing 
businesses to operate outside the taxicab medallion system in various 
localities. Parts III.A and III.B also explain why the tax opportunism 
characterization more accurately captures a distinctive aspect of the conduct 
of certain sharing economy businesses than either regulatory arbitrage or 
outright illegality. In Part III.C, we describe the microbusiness character of 
the sharing economy and the challenges that this creates. 
 
A.  Tax Opportunism: The Information Reporting Example 
 
A dominant narrative for describing the regulatory strategies of sharing 
economy businesses suggests that these businesses possess a flagrant and 
aggressive disregard for the law, engaging in outright legal violations on the 
theory that it is better to beg forgiveness later than ask permission in 
advance.160 We offer an alternative narrative—tax opportunism—to 
describe certain aspects of how sharing businesses have dealt with tax laws 
and regulations.  
  
1. Opportunism, Arbitrage, and Illegality 
 
a. Tax Opportunism 
 
Tax opportunism arises when a sharing business, which has features in 
common with two regimes (A and B) that are subject to different regulatory 
treatment (with A being more lightly regulated), takes the position that it 
                                                
160 See, e.g., Clampet, supra note 6. 
26-Feb-15] CAN SHARING BE TAXED? 33 
looks more like A than B. Certain sharing businesses tend to engage in such 
tax opportunism where there is ambiguity regarding which regime applies. 
When engaging in opportunistic behavior, the sharing economy business 
makes a tax reporting or compliance choice for which there is at least some 
legal basis. That choice provides a regulatory advantage to the sharing 
business as compared with the (arguably more appropriate) alternative 
reporting or compliance position. 
Of course, taxpayer adoption of favorable reporting positions is not 
surprising or unusual. Many other taxpayers adopt favorable tax return 
positions and lobby lawmakers for favorable regulatory treatment.   
Therefore, in a sense, the opportunism displayed by the sharing businesses 
is not a new phenomenon. However, sharing does present a unique context 
in which such behavior arises. First, the sharing sector represents a material 
shift in the way businesses are structured and workers are hired, and sharing 
represents a notable departure from traditional industries for which it 
substitutes, such as transportation and housing. The uniqueness of sharing 
presents businesses with an opportunity to adopt favorable regulatory 
positions supported by small gaps and ambiguities in the law.161 
Second, there are notable aspects of how the sharing industry has 
exercised opportunism that are peculiar to the sharing sector. For example, 
unlike some other businesses, sharing businesses have staked out potentially 
aggressive reporting positions without having first sought advance rulings 
or having consulted with taxing authorities. Many sharing businesses have 
taken these actions in plain sight. In other words, the opportunistic behavior 
of the industry is not hidden on a line of a tax return. The industry’s ability 
to act opportunistically in this manner may be partly due to the uniqueness 
of sharing as a technology-based sector without large capital and physical 
infrastructure outlays upfront. It might also stem from sharing businesses’ 
ability to tap into an enthusiastic demographic of consumers to harness 
public support for favorable regulatory treatment in a way not available to 
other nascent industries. 
Tax opportunism is a distinct category of behaviors and is best 
understood in comparison to the two other analytical categories that might 
describe the sharing economy’s regulatory actions: regulatory arbitrage162 
and outright illegality. Tax opportunism’s meaningful differences from 
these two categories suggest different regulatory prescriptions.163  
 
                                                
161 This is not to say there is not also vocal opposition to the opportunism exhibited by 
sharing. 
162 See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 230 (2010). 
163 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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b. Regulatory Arbitrage 
 
Regulatory arbitrage can be understood to mean those situations in 
which a participant pursues a particular transaction form or structure in 
order to secure identified regulatory benefits, even though that structure 
may add non-regulatory transaction costs.164 According to one definition, an 
actor engages in regulatory arbitrage when it “manipulates the structure of a 
deal to take advantage of a gap between the economic substance of a 
transaction and its regulatory treatment.”165 The actor will take this step if it 
determines that the costs of adjusting the plan (including transaction costs 
and legal constraints such as anti-abuse rules)166 are outweighed by the 
regulatory advantages.   
The tax opportunism exercised by sharing actors is different from 
regulatory arbitrage because to the best of our knowledge, the sharing 
businesses are not modifying or redesigning their business structure in order 
to take advantage of regulatory gaps, at least not yet. Rather, they appear to 
be recognizing and seizing an opportunity inherent in current law to stake 
out a favorable tax or regulatory position. Thus, the taxpayer’s “first best” 
business structure also provides the components for the advantageous tax 
argument. As explored in Part IV, the distinction between opportunism and 
arbitrage is important because the tax system might pursue different 
strategies and responses to combat opportunism, as opposed to regulatory 
arbitrage.  
 
c. Illegality 
 
Our framing of sharing actor behavior as tax opportunism is also distinct 
from a claim of outright illegality or failure to comply with obvious rules. 
Some commentators have claimed, for example, that sharing businesses 
regularly flout the law, perhaps with the goal of allowing the industry to 
take hold before acquiescing to regulation in order to pressure the 
                                                
164 Fleischer, supra note 162. Whether the transaction (1) is modified from its original 
design at some cost to secure the desired regulatory benefits, or (2) was designed at the 
outset with an eye to the regulatory advantages despite additional costs incurred, is not 
relevant here. Both cases constitute regulatory arbitrage as we understand it in that the 
parties incur extra costs to pursue a design that provides regulatory benefits. The difference 
between the two scenarios might depend on factors such as the stage at which advisors and 
lawyers became involved and the degree to which the arbitrage opportunity has become 
widely known. Both scenarios are distinct from the dynamics that have occurred in the 
sharing economy, where desirable treatment has become available largely due to the 
inherent unique business design of the sector.  
165 Fleischer, supra note 162, at 230. 
166 Id. at 230, 253. 
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government for a preferable regulatory treatment.167 We think, however, 
that in a number of cases, the tax rules are not so obvious that failure to 
embrace the most onerous interpretation can be fairly labeled “illegal.” Tax 
opportunism takes advantage of actual gaps and inconsistencies in the law, 
even though such gaps may be small. While taxpayers, tax advisors, and the 
IRS sometimes disagree on when conduct constitutes intentional 
noncompliance as compared to viable taxpayer interpretation, both exist, 
and the law treats intentional disregard differently from plausible 
interpretation.168 As was the case with distinguishing tax opportunism from 
arbitrage, recognizing that tax opportunism may be distinct from illegality 
may suggest a different set of regulatory strategies for managing such 
opportunism.169  
 
2. Tax Opportunism in Information Reporting 
 
A key instance of sharing businesses engaging in tax opportunism is the 
position taken by some of these businesses with respect to third-party 
information reporting. Information reporting and withholding are two 
mechanisms by which taxing authorities secure taxpayer compliance with 
tax payment obligations. Information reporting generally refers to a process 
by which a third-party payor reports to the IRS amounts that the payor paid 
to a payee. Withholding occurs when a third-party payor withholds a 
specified amount from a payment made to the payee and remits that amount 
to the IRS.170 Third-party information reporting and withholding help the 
IRS identify income earned by taxpayers and collect income tax due.171 
Studies suggest that in sectors where information reporting and withholding 
are difficult to impose (e.g., cash businesses), tax compliance declines.172 
                                                
167 See, e.g., Clampet, supra note 6.  
168 Criminal tax law, for example, treats certain taxpayer conduct as a willful failure to 
comply with the law, not a plausible disagreement warranting merely back taxes, interest 
charges, and civil penalties from the errant taxpayer. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201. 
169 See infra Part IV. 
170 See infra Part III.B.1, discussing the employee/independent contractor debate. 
171 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: 
When is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733 (2010); Joel 
Slemrod, supra note 17. 
172 Id.; see also James Alm, John Deskins, Michael McKee, Do Individuals Comply on 
Income Not Reported by their Employer? 39(2) PUB. FIN. REV. 120 (2009) (finding, in part 
based on experiments, that individuals who have relatively more nonmatched income (i.e., 
income not subject to third party information reporting) have significantly lower tax 
compliance rates than those with less nonmatched income); Morse, et al. supra note 17 
(finding, in part, based on field interviews, that almost all interviewees believed that small 
businesses did not report some cash income; that interviewees frequently opined that such 
failure was important (sometimes more important) for payroll tax and sales tax evasion, as 
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a. General Information Reporting Rules 
 
Because the sharing businesses have taken the position that sharing 
earners are independent contractors, the sharing businesses are not 
withholding on amounts paid to sharing earners.173 Sharing businesses are, 
however, responsible for information reporting with respect to independent 
contractor income.174 There are two primary information reporting regimes 
that are relevant to the sharing economy: Form 1099-MISC information 
reporting required under I.R.C. § 6041 and Form 1099-K information 
reporting required under I.R.C. § 6050W.175 I.R.C. § 6041 generally 
requires persons engaged in a trade or business and paying rents, salaries, 
compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or certain other fixed or 
determinable gains, profits, and income of $600 or more to report the 
payment (to the Service and the recipient) on Form 1099-MISC.176 For tax 
years before 2011, Form 1099-MISC would have been the form used to 
report amounts paid to independent contractors. 
I.R.C. § 6050W, effective January 2012 for the 2011 tax year, now 
requires “payment settlement entities” (PSEs) to report certain credit card 
payments and third party network transactions on Form 1099-K. The statute 
divides PSEs into two groups and applies different information reporting 
obligations to each. First, banks and other “merchant acquiring entities”177 
must report all payments made to payees in settlement of credit card 
transactions.178 Second, all “third party settlement organizations”179 making 
                                                                                                                       
well as income tax evasion; and that many small businesses that evade taxes do so by 
“constructing parallel cash economies” (i.e., collecting cash, paying expenses in cash, using 
cash for purchases without depositing it, hoarding cash, not recording cash transactions, 
and self-financing)). 
173 See, e.g., LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/drive/help/article/1229158 (“drivers . . . are 
not employees of the company”); LYFT https://www.lyft.com/drive/help/article/1229066 
(explaining that as non-employees, drivers may receive information returns  (a Form-1099-
MISC or a Form 1099-K) or nothing at all, depending on the driver’s income and 
activities). 
174 See supra sources cited in note 173. 
175 A different third party reporting regime, along with special tax burdens, apply to 
those making payments to employees. See supra Part.II.C.1. Because the sharing 
businesses have classified sharing earners as independent contractors, withholding does not 
apply. Id. 
176 See IRS 2015 Instructions for Form 1099-MISC, at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/i1099msc.pdf.  
177 The term is defined to cover entities with a contractual obligation to make payments 
to participating payees in payment card transactions. I.R.C. § 6050W(b)(2). 
178 Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(a)(4)(A). These payors are collectively known as 
“merchant acquiring entities.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(b)(2). 
179 “Third party settlement organizations” are those central organizations with the 
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payments to payees in settlement of third party network transactions must 
report such payments on Form 1099-K if the payments to the participating 
payee exceed $20,000 and if there are more than 200 transactions with the 
participating payee.180 The term “third party settlement organization” was 
meant to include services such as PayPal, Amazon, and Google 
Checkout.181 Thus, it is clear that “merchant acquiring entities” (such as 
certain banks) are subject to more stringent information reporting 
obligations than “third party settlement organizations,” because third party 
settlement organizations need only report when high income and transaction 
volume thresholds are met. 
Two additional rules are significant. First, persons who receive 
payments from PSEs on behalf of other participating payees and who 
distribute such payments to those payees are treated as “aggregate payees.” 
An aggregate payee is treated as the payee with respect to the PSE making 
the initial payment but is itself viewed as the PSE with respect to the 
participating payees to whom it distributes the aggregated payment.182 Thus, 
for example, an aggregate payee receiving payments from a bank in 
settlement of credit card transactions would receive a Form 1099-K from 
that bank reporting those payments, and would in turn have to issue a Form 
1099-K to each payee to whom it distributed the payments.183 
Second, regulations under I.R.C. § 6050W and the instructions to Form 
1099-K clarify the intended coordination between Form 1099-K and Form 
1099-MISC issuances. If a payment is made by credit card (or through a 
third party payment network) and that payment would otherwise be subject 
to reporting on a Form 1099-MISC, no Form 1099-MISC need be issued by 
the business purchasing the goods or services. Instead, any reporting is 
made by the PSE on a Form 1099-K, to the extent required by I.R.C. § 
6050W.184 For example, if a business pays a repair person $600 via credit 
card to fix business equipment, then prior to the new I.R.C. § 6050W rules, 
the business would have been required to issue a Form 1099-MISC to the 
                                                                                                                       
contractual obligation to make payment to participating payees of third party network 
transactions. I.R.C. § 6050W(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(c)(2). 
180 I.R.C. § 6050W(e). 
181 See Kelly Phillips Erb, Credit Cards, The IRS, Form 1099-K and the $19,399 
Reporting Hole, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/08/29/credit-cards-the-irs-form-1099-k-
and-the-19399-reporting-hole/ (using PayPal as an example of the kind of entity classified 
as a third party settlement organizations). 
182 Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(d)(1). 
183 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(e) example 21. The regulations are not entirely 
clear on the application of the aggregate payee rule where the initial PSE is a third party 
settlement organization and not a merchant acquiring entity. 
184 Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(iv). See also IRS Instructions for Form 1099-K (2015) at 
3. 
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repair person under I.R.C. § 6041. After new I.R.C. § 6050W, however, the 
business does not issue a Form 1099-MISC. Instead the bank paying on the 
credit card issues a Form 1099-K.185 Both the regulations and the Form 
1099-K instructions provide that in determining whether a payment is 
subject to the Form 1099-K reporting regime rather than the Form 1099-
MISC regime, the $20,000/200 transaction threshold is disregarded.186 A 
likely interpretation of this language is that I.R.C. § 6050W applies if the 
payment is made by either category of PSE, and furthermore, that if the 
payor is a third party settlement organization, then no reporting (under 
either Form 1099-K or 1099-MISC) would be required for payments below 
the threshold of $20,000 and 200 transactions.187 As discussed below, this 
intersection of the rules gives rise to a potentially large reporting gap in the 
case of third party settlement organizations.188 But at least one commentator 
has proposed an alternative viable interpretation: all payments that are now 
not reportable on Form 1099-MISC must now be reported on Form 1099-K, 
regardless of the de minimis threshold.189  
 
b. Information Reporting Positions Taken by Sharing Businesses and 
Potential Effects 
 
Against this backdrop, Lyft and Sidecar have taken the position that, for 
the 2014 tax year, their drivers (whom they treat as independent 
contractors) will receive: (1) Form 1099-K if the driver provided more than 
200 rides and received more than $20,000 for these rides during the year; 
and (2) a Form 1099-MISC if the driver earned referral bonuses or other 
special direct payments from Lyft or Sidecar during the year exceeding 
                                                
185 Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(v) examples 1 and 2. 
186 Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(iv); Form 1099-K instructions at 3. 
187 Eric Christenson & Amanda Kottke, Guidance Needed to Clarify Reporting 
Obligations for Online Marketplaces and Peer-to-Peer Platforms (July 14, 2014), TM 
Memorandum (BNA).  
188 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.B. If a business makes a payment via a third party 
network (such as PayPal) of $600 or more that would previously be reported on Form 
1099-MISC, the business no longer reports on Form 1099-MISC. Instead, the reporting 
obligation presumably shifts to the third party settlement organization (in this example, 
PayPal) under I.R.C. § 6050W. The gap arises because PayPal does not issue a Form 1099-
K unless the payments to the payee equal at least $20,000 and there are at least 200 
transactions. Therefore payments of $600 or more that previously would have been 
reported are unlikely to be reported, except in the case of significant payees (those with 
high dollar volume and many transactions). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-(a)(iv); Instructions 
for Form 1099-K (2015) at 3. See also Erb, supra note 181 (IRS confirmed that there is a 
notable reporting hole created by the intersection of I.R.C. §§ 6041 and 6050W). 
189 See Christianson & Kottke, supra note 187. 
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$600.190 Until early 2015, Uber also took this position.191 This reporting 
position indicates that the ridesharing businesses consider themselves each a 
“third party settlement organization” under I.R.C. § 6050W, akin to 
businesses such as PayPal.192 As such, they would have no reporting 
obligations for payments made for rides unless the driver exceeds the 
reporting threshold of $20,000 and 200 rides.  
In early 2015, Uber changed its position and announced that it would 
issue a Form 1099-K to all drivers for their driving income, regardless of 
thresholds.193 It is not clear what prompted Uber to embrace a more 
burdensome reporting policy of issuing a Form 1099-K to each driver, 
given that its own business practices remained unchanged. It is also not 
certain how Uber is justifying its shifting position without conceding that it 
reported improperly in the prior three years.194  
Uber, Lyft and Sidecar will also issue drivers a Form 1099-MISC for 
their own direct payments (e.g., bonuses) of $600 or more because in that 
facet of the relationship, they do not serve as an intermediary of any type 
between riders and drivers. For such direct payments, the rules of I.R.C. § 
6041 apply because the I.R.C. § 6050W rules do not.195  
The Form 1099-K information reporting position taken by the 
ridesharing businesses gives rise to an information-reporting gap because 
drivers who do not earn ride income exceeding $20,000 through more than 
200 rides will not have their income reported to the IRS.196 While the 
                                                
190 LYFT DRIVER CENTER,  https://drivers.lyft.com/customers/portal/articles/1229066; 
SIDECAR, http://support.side.cr/customer/portal/articles/924061; SIDECAR,  
http://support.side.cr/customer/portal/articles/924061-does-driving-incur-any-taxes-. See 
also Justine Sharrock, Life Behind The Wheel In The New Ridesharing Economy, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (May 8, 2013), http://www.buzzfeed.com/justinesharrock/life-behind-
the-wheel-in-the-new-rideshare-economy; Pender, supra note 7. 
191 THE RIDESHARE GUY, http://therideshareguy.com/all-of-your-2014-rideshare-tax-
questions-answered-a-turbotax-giveaway/; RIDESHAREDASHBOARD, 
http://ridesharedashboard.com/2015/01/08/uber-lyft-taxes-what-to-do-your-taxes-without-
1099/. 
192 I.R.C. § 6050W; see also, generally, Kathleen Pender, Here’s Why Uber and Lyft 
Send Drivers Such Confusing Tax Forms, SFGATE (Feb. 20, 2015),  
http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Here-s-why-Uber-and-Lyft-send-drivers-
such-6092403.php. 
193 Id.; ZEN99, https://tryzen99.com/blog_posts/read-uber-1099.  
194 It is possible that Uber would argue it is merely insuring that they are providing the 
fullest information possible to all parties, including the government. 
195 The fact that Lyft and Uber plan to issue a Form 1099-MISC for these payments 
indicates that the payments will not be made by credit card or third party payment network. 
If the payments were so made, a Form 1099-K issued by the PSE would presumably be the 
appropriate document. 
196 Lyft itself has acknowledged the existence of that gap. LYFT DRIVER CENTER,   
https://drivers.lyft.com/customers/portal/articles/1229066 (“Drivers who do not meet either 
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absence of third-party reporting does not relieve drivers of the obligation to 
report all driving related income on their tax returns, it does makes it more 
difficult for the IRS to track total receipts and ensure gross income 
inclusions.197  
The tax information reporting position taken by ridesharing businesses 
(Lyft and Sidecar to the present, and Uber till early 2015) is an instance of 
tax opportunism in action. When faced with potentially ambiguous third 
party reporting obligations under I.R.C. § 6050W, these sharing businesses 
chose the less burdensome interpretation by identifying themselves as “third 
party settlement organizations” rather than as “merchant acquiring entities.” 
Yet, the correctness of this position is debatable. First, it is far from clear 
that the “third party settlement organization” category was intended to 
cover Uber, Lyft and Sidecar as well as Amazon, PayPal, and Google 
Checkout. There are important differences between ridesharing and these 
online settlement organizations, such as various controls over driver 
conduct. Second, it is possible that a sharing business might be viewed as an 
“aggregate payee” under I.R.C. § 6050W. Under that theory, the ridesharing 
business itself receives a Form 1099-K from its own PSE (bank) and then 
would be regarded as a PSE vis à vis the drivers. The characterization of 
ridesharing businesses as aggregate payees might call into question the 
claim that they are “third party settlement organizations.” Third, as noted 
above,198 the proper relationship between Form 1099-MISC and Form 
1099-K reporting may still be ambiguous regarding application of the 200 
transactions/$20,000 de minimis threshold.199 The alternative interpretation 
leaves the possibility that there is no statutory gap, and if reporting under 
I.R.C. § 6041 is not required, then I.R.C. § 6050W (Form 1099-K) reporting 
might be required regardless of how few transactions or how little earned.200  
Finally, it should be noted that this interpretation of information 
reporting responsibilities has not been universally embraced by all sharing 
businesses. As discussed, Uber is now filing Forms 1099-K for all drivers. 
Airbnb, which announced its shift to Form 1099-K reporting for 2013, is 
also apparently taking the position that it is a merchant acquiring entity 
obligated to report all payments made to hosts regardless of size.201 On the 
                                                                                                                       
of the above criteria in the last year will not receive a tax form.); see also supra note 188 
and accompanying text. 
197 But see discussion infra Part III.A.2.c. 
198 See supra notes 187-189 and accompanying discussion. 
199 See supra notes 186-189 and accompanying discussion. 
200 Christianson & Kottke, supra note 187. 
201 See, e.g., AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/414 (noting that (“[i]n 
previous years, we issued 1099-MISC forms to hosts. Starting with the 2013 tax year, 
we’re sending 1099-K forms instead. This shouldn’t change the way you file your taxes.”); 
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/481 (“[W]e'll provide hosts who've submitted 
26-Feb-15] CAN SHARING BE TAXED? 41 
other hand, TaskRabbit appears to be taking the position that unless the 
Tasker has earned over $20,000, no Form 1099-K will be issued.202 
Gigwalk, a similar service to TaskRabbit, will not itself be issuing Forms 
1099-K but rather will be leaving it to PayPal to provide such forms, and 
PayPal will not provide a Form 1099-K unless the more than 200 
transactions/$20,000 threshold is met.203 The heterogeneity of industry 
interpretations suggests that the notion that Lyft and Sidecar are “third party 
settlement organizations” is at least questionable. 
 
c. Comparison to Taxicab Industry Reporting Positions 
 
It is instructive to compare the information reporting positions taken by 
certain ridesharing businesses with the positions taken by a traditional 
industry with which ridesharing companies compete: the taxicab industry. 
The usual income and expense tax rules apply to the taxicab industry.204 
However, the types of ownership, leasing, and driving arrangements in the 
taxicab industry are heterogeneous.205 Therefore, no single pattern of third 
party information reporting encompasses all taxicab companies.  
According to the IRS taxicab industry audit techniques guide, some 
26% of taxi-drivers in 2008 were self-employed.206 Self-employed taxi 
drivers, for whom there is no commercial intermediary between them and 
the passenger public, would presumably receive Form 1099-K from their 
bank or other credit card settlement entity for payments received by credit 
card,207 but not for cash transactions or cash tips.208 Drivers who work for 
                                                                                                                       
a W-9 with a Form 1099-K showing their reportable earnings from the previous year.”); 
see also Pender, supra note 7.  
202 TASKRABBIT, https://taskrabbit.zendesk.com/entries/61642320-Tax-Information.  
203 GIGWALK, https://gigwalk.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/203202350-Will-I-be-
receiving-a-1099-or-other-tax-form-. 
204 See I.R.C. §§ 61, 62, 67. 68. 162, 168, 179. 
205 In New York City, for example, some drivers own individual medallions and own 
and drive their own taxicabs. See 2014 TAXICAB FACT BOOK, NEW YORK CITY TAXI & 
LIMOUSINE COMMISSION at 1, 8 (2014), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/2014_taxicab_fact_book.pdf.; Design Trust 
for Public Space and New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission, TAXI 07: ROADS 
FORWARD at 40-51 (2007) available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/taxi_book.pdf. Some own the vehicle but lease 
the medallion from a medallion owner or lease manager. Some drivers lease both cab and 
medallion from a fleet owner.  Thus, the industry encompasses a number of different 
business relationships. 
206 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CASH INTENSIVE BUSINESSES AUDIT TECHNIQUES 
GUIDE (revised April 2010), Chapter 17, at 3 [hereinafter IRS AUDIT GUIDE] available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/cashchapter17_248965.pdf.  
207 Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6050W. 
208 http://www.stl-taxi.com/documents/1099-k.pdf  
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taxicab companies may be classified as independent contractors or 
employees.209 Employees would presumably receive a Form W-2 from the 
employer setting forth their income and withholding amounts but would 
have to report tips to the employer per I.R.C. § 6053(a).210  
Independent contractor drivers who work through a taxicab company 
and receive payment on non-cash fares through that company would also 
receive a Form 1099 from the company. Presumably because the payment is 
originating with the passenger, the taxicab company would issue Form 
1099-K to drivers rather than Form 1099-MISC.211 At present, the apparent 
trend among taxicab companies is to consider themselves aggregate payees 
for Form 1099-K reporting purposes. The taxicab companies would receive 
a Form 1099-K from banks with respect to credit card payments, and would 
(as aggregate payee) in turn issue a Form 1099-K to each independent 
contractor driver.212 Attorney advisers to taxicab companies seem to be 
taking the position that all amounts must be reported, no matter how 
small.213 Thus, the ridesharing businesses and the taxicab companies appear 
to have pursued different interpretations of I.R.C. § 6050W, with many of 
the ridesharing businesses tending to adopt the less onerous reporting 
stance.  
 
d. Potential Tax Compliance Effects of Form 1099-K Reporting  
 
Despite the general expectation that third party reporting improves tax 
compliance, the precise compliance impacts of some sharing businesses’ 
decision to embrace the Form 1099-K $20,000/200 rides reporting threshold 
(and not reporting unless that threshold is crossed) are not entirely clear. 
Tax compliance research to date indicates that compliance is higher for 
income subject to information reporting than, say, cash. This evidence 
would suggest that higher reporting thresholds would have a negative 
impact on taxpayer compliance.214   
                                                
209 IRS AUDIT GUIDE, supra note 206, at 3. 
210 Id. at 7; see also I.R.C. § 6053(a). 
211 I.R.C. § 6041. 
212 Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(d)(1), (e), Example 22. 
213 Chip Watkins, Form 1099 Update, available at 
http://octap.net/form_1099_update.pdf; Sarah E. Mooney, Update on the New Form 1099-
K Rules: Q & A, DISPATCH (Taxicab, Limousine, and Paratransit Association) (Feb. 2011) 
available at http://www.stl-taxi.com/documents/1099-k.pdf; 2011 Year in Review, 
TRANSPORTATION LEADER (2012), http://www.tlpa.org/news/2011_Year_in_Review.pdf 
(advising that “One credit card transaction is sufficient to trigger the Form 1099-K 
reporting obligation). 
214 See Morse et al., supra note 17; Alm et al., supra note 172; Brian Erard & Chih-
Chih Ho, Explaining the U.S. Income Tax Compliance Continuum, 1(2) EJOURNAL OF TAX 
RESEARCH 93 (2003), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/eJlTaxR/2003/5.html (finding, 
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On the other hand, the study of Form 1099-K reporting is in its infancy 
and studies of the impact of Form 1099-K on the sharing economy are 
nonexistent. There are reasons to think that the effectiveness of Form 1099-
K in ensuring compliance may be limited. For example, Leandra Lederman 
suggests that the effectiveness of Form 1099-K on tax compliance may be 
limited due to its inability to track cash and to monitor expenses.215 A recent 
study of Form 1099-K reporting suggested that while Form 1099-K might 
lead to increased reported receipts among certain taxpayers, this increase 
might be partially offset by increases in reported expenses.216 That same 
study suggested, however, that Form 1099-K might incentivize taxpayers 
who had not previously filed Schedule C to file that form.217 Yet another 
study suggests that small business owners might regard credit card 
payments as reportable (in contrast to cash payments), even in the absence 
of third-party information reporting.218 While the study examines a different 
group of businesses, it does raise the possibility that the electronic nature of 
amounts earned in ridesharing may incentivize drivers to report such 
income, regardless of whether Form 1099-K is received.219  
These studies indicate that the effects of Form 1099-K on tax 
                                                                                                                       
based on micro-simulation database of encompassing both nonfilers and underreporters, 
that compliance across 34 occupational groups has strong positive association with share of 
income subject to third party reporting but strong negative association with the burden of 
preparing and filing a tax return.).  
215 Lederman, supra note 171 (arguing that I.R.C. § 6050W reporting effectiveness 
may be impacted by the fact that (1) taxpayer basis is not tracked, (2) high reporting 
thresholds may exclude many taxpayers from reporting, and (3) Form 1099-K amounts 
cannot be easily matched to tax return amounts). 
216 Slemrod et al., supra note 17 (Estimating that 1099-K introduction led to 24% 
increase in reported receipts for those firms reporting receipts exactly equal the 1099-K-
reported amount. However, this group of firms also increased reported expenses 13%, 
which offsets the impact of Form 1099-K on total tax payments, even in groups most 
strongly affected by Form 1099-K). 
217 Id. (finding that of firms reporting receipts within 5% of the Form 1099-K amount, 
66% did not file Schedule C in the previous year. Of firms reporting exactly the Form 
1099-K amount, half did not file Schedule C in previous year). 
218 Morse, supra note 17 (reporting that most interviewees regarded credit card receipts 
as taxable and reportable revenue).  
219 Increased reporting among drivers could be the result of either (1) knowing that 
most rides are paid for by credit card, or (2) the belief that Uber’s deposits and payments to 
drivers are akin to credit cards in their ability to be traced. One caveat in trying to translate 
the findings of the Morse et al., study to the sharing economy concerns the nature of the 
taxpayers studied. To the extent the study focused on small, cash-based business owners, 
such taxpayers may have a different perspective on their likelihood of audit as compared to 
occasional part-time sharing earners. Thus, the two groups may think about the 
implications of credit card reporting and the Service’s ability and inclination to track and 
trace payments differently. For example, ridesharing drivers may have devoted less 
attention to thinking through issues of audit trigger versus audit investigation. 
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compliance are likely to be complex. In general, it seems likely that higher 
reporting thresholds may adversely affect tax compliance in some respects 
and that more comprehensive information reporting would facilitate greater 
degrees of tax compliance (in terms of income inclusion and Schedule C 
filing). On the other hand, this effect may be partially offset by other factors 
(such as increased expense taking). The extent to which these effects occur 
would warrant further study.  
 
e. Explaining the Information Reporting Positions of Sharing 
Businesses 
 
Why are some sharing businesses embracing high information reporting 
thresholds? Why are others content to report all income? Why do some 
change their positions midstream? It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
set forth a comprehensive theory of why tax opportunism occurs (and why 
it sometimes does not). Suffice to say that there are clear regulatory 
advantages to sharing businesses of embracing less onerous information 
reporting.  
First, there are obvious benefits associated with not having to incur the 
costs of issuing tax forms to every single driver and the IRS. Second, 
because information reporting gives the Service an accurate picture of the 
income received by each ridesharing driver, the absence of information 
reporting below the threshold, accords low-earning/low-frequency drivers 
the (illegal) opportunity to not declare income receipts on their tax return. 
This can effectively lower the tax costs to marginal drivers and may 
incentivize such drivers to engage in ridesharing driving when they 
otherwise might have been deterred by the tax compliance and other tax 
costs.  Regardless of the long-term stability of this information reporting 
position, it may have the regulatory advantage of helping draw new drivers 
to invest in a ridesharing career at the outset in the hope of keeping them in 
the sector down the road. Again, we do not claim that drivers will definitely 
take advantage of this opportunity to underreport. As noted, further 
empirical study is required to ascertain the precise impact of Form 1099-K 
information reporting.220 Our point, rather, is that embracing less onerous 
information reporting thresholds renders these opportunities available. 
 
B.  Other Examples of Tax Opportunism  
 
Although the tax opportunism described above concerned tax 
compliance, we anticipate that this phenomenon could also arise with regard 
                                                
220 See supra Part III.A.2.c.  
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to substantive tax rules, or rules that might effectively bridge the two 
categories. We now discuss three other instances of tax opportunism, some 
of which might arguably bridge the gap between substantive law and tax 
compliance. These are: (1) the sharing businesses’ decision to classify 
sharing workers as independent contractors rather than employees, (2) 
Airbnb’s initial position with respect to local occupancy taxes, and (3) the 
ridesharing businesses’ decision to operate outside of the taxicab medallion 
system. 
 
1. Sharing Economy Businesses and the Employee-Independent 
Contractor Divide 
 
As discussed above, classification of a worker as an employee rather 
than an independent contractor gives rise to disparate employment tax 
obligations.221 Generally speaking, if the individual receiving payment is an 
employee, then the employer has reporting, withholding, and employment 
tax payment obligations. Employers would have to withhold federal income 
taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes from the wages of 
employees and provide employees with a Form W-2.222 If the individual is 
an independent contractor, then the individual herself is responsible for 
employment taxes, and the employer does not have a withholding 
obligation.223 Thus, the ability to classify workers as independent 
contractors has tangible benefits for the paying entity, and may lead to a 
tendency to “overclassify” workers as independent contractors to avoid the 
additional withholding and tax burdens associated with having employees.  
The determination of worker classification, which rests initially in the 
hands of the paying entity, represents an instance of tax opportunism. As 
was the case with information reporting, sharing businesses have embraced 
the less onerous independent contractor classification. The unique structure 
of sharing businesses offers a clear opportunity to treat sharing earners 
(drivers, taskers, etc.) as independent contractors. For example, the fact that 
ridesharing businesses may be able to claim that they function as 
matchmakers between buyer and seller of services through technology 
platforms may be used to buttress independent contractor classification.224 
Such arguments may not be available to traditional industries such as 
taxicabs.  
                                                
221 See supra text accompanying notes 145-146. 
222 I.R.C. §§ 3401, 3402, 3501 et seq.; see generally IRS Publication 15, “Employer’s 
Tax Guide,” http://www.irs.gov/publications/p15/ar02.html.  
223 See sources supra note 222; see also I.R.C. § 6041. 
224 The sharing businesses may be drawing an implicit or explicit parallel to Amazon 
and PayPal. 
46 CAN SHARING BE TAXED? [26-Feb-15 
Yet, the question whether independent contractor status is the correct 
classification is an open one. As noted in Part II.C, the line between 
employees and independent contractors is a long established, though 
heavily fact-specific and frequently debated, boundary.225 Commentators 
have noted that it is possible that Uber drivers are more accurately classified 
as employees, and there are a number of pending lawsuits addressing this 
question.226 In addition, tax law developments regarding worker 
classification outside of sharing may be relevant. For example, active 
lawsuits regarding whether FedEx drivers are independent contractors or 
employees may impact the classification of Uber drivers as employees.227 
Although Uber currently treats its drivers as independent contractors,228 
commentators have observed that the FedEx litigation may constrain 
ridesharing services’ ability to so classify their drivers.229 Even if sharing 
earners are subsequently adjudged to be employees, however, the initial 
embrace of independent contractor classification holds benefits for sharing 
businesses. First, it puts the burden of litigating the issue on the shoulders of 
workers who claim employee classification, and whose interests are 
dispersed. Second, even if sharing earners are eventually found to be 
employees, independent contractor classification lowers costs for sharing 
businesses during the time period it is in effect.  
It is important to note that, as was the case with information reporting, 
there is no evidence that the sharing economy deliberately structured its 
transactions to arbitrage between these regulatory categories. Further, 
because it is possible that independent contractor classification might be 
appropriate, this is not an instance of outright illegality. As was the case in 
the prior example, opportunism more accurately describes the behaviors of 
the sharing businesses than either arbitrage or illegality. 
 
2. Airbnb and Local Hotel and Occupancy Taxes 
 
One of the most volatile tax issues arising in home sharing has been the 
                                                
225 See supra note II.C.1. 
226 Farrell, supra note 60. 
227 See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Packaging System, Inc., 765 F.3d 984 
(2014); Ben Rooney, The FedEx driver who sued and won, CNN (Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/11/20/news/companies/fedex-driver-lawsuit/index.html.  
228 See, e.g., supra footnote 143. 
229 Patrick Hoge, Independent contractor ruling on FedEx could affect “Sharing 
Economy”, SAN FRAN. BUS. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/2014/08/independent-contractor-
ruling-fedex-uber-lyft.html?page=all; Will Small, Ninth Circuit Rules FedEx Misclassified 
Workers, (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.smallschena.com/blog/2014/8/29/ninth-circuit-rules-
fedex-misclassified-workers. 
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sector’s position on local hotel and occupancy taxes. As discussed above, 
Airbnb initially adopted the position that it was not responsible for 
collecting local hotel and occupancy taxes because it did not own the rooms 
rented and functioned merely as an intermediary.230 This position actually 
has two dimensions: First, that Airbnb was not liable for such taxes because 
the individual hosts were the ones responsible; and second, that Airbnb had 
no liability as a collection agent for such taxes.231  
The taking of this position constitutes another example of tax 
opportunism. Like certain ridesharing businesses’ position that they are 
“third party settlement organizations,” Airbnb’s unwillingness to collect and 
remit occupancy taxes provided it with two potential commercial 
advantages:  
First, collection and remittance of the taxes would impose 
administrative costs on Airbnb, and avoidance of these costs for as long as 
possible would provide an advantage over competitors who have to incur 
such costs (i.e., the hotel industry). Second, if Airbnb did not collect and 
remit the tax, it would be unlikely that the hosts would do so, particularly as 
new, sporadic, nonprofessional entrants into the world of short-term rentals. 
Thus, non-collection and non-remittance of occupancy taxes could give 
Airbnb a competitive pricing advantage over hotels and could also help 
entice more guests and hosts into home sharing by lowering tax-inclusive 
rental prices and apparent transaction costs, thereby increasing the 
competitiveness and viability of the new sector.  
In sum, even though it is becoming increasingly apparent that Airbnb’s 
initial position might be unsustainable, it has given Airbnb and its hosts and 
guests a material short-term advantage. Airbnb has now entered into 
agreements with a number of cities and localities, providing that it will be 
responsible for withholding and paying over the occupancy taxes.232 
However, such agreements have been piecemeal and Airbnb is still not 
collecting occupancy taxes in the majority of cities. Furthermore, this 
regulatory strategy has yielded the advantage that most localities have not 
been able to obtain payment of back taxes from Airbnb.233 
                                                
230 See supra Part II.C.2. 
231 See, e.g., San Francisco Business and Tax Regulations, Art. 7, 1.504-1. 
232 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/653; see also supra Part II.C.2 and 
sources cited supra note 158. 
233 Airbnb recently agreed to pay back taxes to San Francisco. See Joyce E. Cutler, 
Airbnb Pays San Francisco Back Taxes While Opponents Plan Tighter Regulations (BNA 
Snapshot, Feb. 20, 2015); Matier & Ross, supra note 158; Emily Badger, Airbnb Is About 
To Start Collecting Hotel Taxes In More Major Cities, Including Washington, WASH. 
POST. (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/29/airbnb-is-about-to-start-
collecting-hotel-taxes-in-more-major-cities-including-washington/ (in negotiations with 
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As was the case with information reporting, the position taken by 
Airbnb with respect to occupancy taxes is an instance of tax opportunism 
rather than arbitrage or illegality. The nature of the Airbnb business model 
—connecting private hosts with potential renters via an internet platform— 
supported Airbnb’s claim that it looks sufficiently unlike a traditional hotel 
that Airbnb itself is not liable for the local occupancy tax. Thus, this is not 
the same as outright defiance of the law. There is also no evidence that 
Airbnb deliberately structured its business model in order to make this legal 
argument. Thus, this is not a case of regulatory arbitrage. In sum, tax 
opportunism most accurately captures the choices of Airbnb with respect to 
compliance with local occupancy taxes. 
 
3. Ridesharing and Taxicab Medallions 
 
One final example of tax opportunism in action can be found in the 
decision by ridesharing businesses not to operate within the taxicab 
medallion and licensing systems run by various localities. Taxicab 
companies have been among the most vocal objectors to the ridesharing 
economy, and among the strongest complaints is that taxicab drivers and 
companies must pay for expensive licenses, medallions, and other costs in 
order to operate their business and vehicles, whereas ridesharing 
competitors operate without such costs.234 While not a tax in the traditional 
sense, taxicab medallion and permitting systems often involve taxes and 
fees paid directly or indirectly to the licensing governments, and are a 
method of revenue raising in some localities. Thus, it is appropriate to 
include this discussion in our analysis of tax opportunism.235  
The taxicab industry is highly regulated by local government agencies, 
in particular, state and local transportation authorities.236 Depending on the 
                                                                                                                       
localities, Airbnb “has not put back taxes on the table anywhere”); Carolyn Said, Airbnb to 
collect SF hotel tax, SFGATE (Sept. 17, 2014 at 12:00pm), 
http://blog.sfgate.com/techchron/2014/09/17/airbnb-to-collect-sf-hotel-tax-oct-1/. 
234 See, e.g., Luz Lazo, Cab Companies Unite Against Uber and Other Ride-share 
Services, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/cab-companies-unite-against-
uber-and-other-ride-share-services/2014/08/10/11b23d52-1e3f-11e4-82f9-
2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html; Maya Rhodan, Taxi Drivers Protest Uber and Lyft, Stop DC 
Traffic, TIME (Oct. 8, 2014), http://time.com/3482420/taxis-uber-lyft-washington-dc/.   
235 The dynamic between ride sharing and taxis raises a wide range of other regulatory 
questions beyond the scope of this article. See generally Lisa Rayle, et al, App-Based, On-
Demand Ride Services: Comparing Taxi and Ridesourcing Trips and User Characteristics 
in San Francisco, University of California Transportation Center UCTC-FR-2014-08 
(August 2014), http://www.uctc.net/research/papers/UCTC-FR-2014-08.pdf.  
236 See generally Bruce Schaller, Entry Controls in Taxi Regulation: Implications of 
US and Canadian Experience for Taxi Regulation and Deregulation, 14 TRANSPORT POL’Y 
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local regulatory body in charge, taxicab drivers and companies may be 
subject to licensing or franchising requirements, more general business 
licensing requirements, permitting requirements and other restrictions on 
entry.237 The industry may also be required to comply with certain 
insurance and safety regulations, rate schedules, and paperwork 
requirements.238   
The New York City taxicab medallion system is an example of a 
regulation system that generates revenue.239 NYC taxicabs are regulated by 
the New York Taxi & Limousine Commission (TLC), a city agency.240 TLC 
is responsible for fare and rate setting and for establishing vehicle safety 
and other rules that owners and drivers must follow.241 New York City 
currently has both yellow (medallion) taxicabs and boro taxicabs.242 This 
discussion focuses on regulation of the yellow taxicabs, which 
predominantly service Manhattan and NY airport pickups.243 The yellow 
                                                                                                                       
490-506 (2007). 
237 One commentator has grouped such “entry controls” into the taxicab sector into 
four prototype systems: (1) “open entry” systems that regulate at the individual taxicab 
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licensing and/or background check requirements); (2) “limited entry” systems that regulate 
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at the entity-level but that also cap the number of franchises available to those entities 
Schaller, supra note 236, at 3-5. In reality, of course, the actual regulatory architecture is 
likely to be a hybrid. Id., at 4-5 (noting that “[i]n practice, entry controls and qualifications 
for entry occupy a spectrum of policies rather than a set of binary choices”). 
238 See generally id.; see also 2014 TAXICAB FACT BOOK, supra note 205. 
239 Cf. Schaller, supra note 236, at 6 (classifying the New York City taxicab industry 
as s limited-entry system that regulates on the individual level). 
240 See generally NYC TAX & LIMOUSINE COMMISSION,  
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LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/industry/industry.shtml.   
241 2014 TAXICAB FACT BOOK, supra note205, at 1; TAXI 07: ROADS FORWARD, supra 
note 205, at 57. TLC interventions include: setting standards for drivers, regulating and 
inspecting vehicles, imposing caps and restrictions on taxi medallions, auctioning off 
medallions, setting fares and rates, and coordinating with other agencies. Id.; see also NYC 
TAX & LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/industry/industry.shtml.  
242 2014 TAXICAB FACT BOOK, supra note 205, at 1-2; see also NYC TAX & 
LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/passenger/shl_passenger.shtml 
(describing boro taxis). 
243 2014 TAXICAB FACT BOOK, supra note 205, at 5 (noting that 90.3% of yellow taxi 
pickups occur in Manhattan and that the next highest percentage of pickups (3.5%) happens 
at the airports). 
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taxicabs are regulated under a medallion system, which dates back to 
1937.244 The medallion is essentially a license to operate the vehicle, and 
the medallion system was enacted to curb cab numbers and bolster driver 
incomes.245 There are two types of medallions – corporate (or “mini-fleet”) 
medallions and individual medallions.246 Individual medallion holders may 
not hold more than one medallion, and individual owners are subject to 
certain shift minimum and driving requirements.247 Corporate medallions 
may be owned by non-driver (nonfleet) owners and fleet owners.248 These 
tend to be consolidated in relatively few hands.249 Taxi Licensing 
Commission rules mandate that corporate medallion vehicles must be 
operated for two shifts a day.250  
Medallions are originally auctioned off by the city, and the city raises 
revenues from medallion sales.251 Medallions can also be sold and 
                                                
244 Id. at 12; see also Lawrence van Gelder, Medallion System Stems from the 30’s 
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http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/rules/rules.shtml (TLC rules). For example, yellow cabs 
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cameras, partitions, etc.) in order to be driven as a taxicab. Medallion Licensing 
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http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/medallion_licensing_guide.pdf, at 8-9 
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(describing the hack-up process). 
245 2014 TAXICAB FACT BOOK, supra note 205, at 12. 
246 Id. 
247 See TLC Rules § 58-20, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/rule_book_current_chapter_58.pdf; see also 
TLC Notice of Rule promulgation, at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/owner_must_drive_version_10.pdf; 2014 
TAXICAB FACT BOOK, supra note 205, at 12; Medallion Sales Information, New York City 
Taxi & Limousine Commission, at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/medallion/html/background/types_owner.shtml.  
248 2014 TAXICAB FACT BOOK, supra note 205, at 12; see also Medallion Sales 
Information, supra note 247. Non-fleet corporate medallion owners lease out their 
corporate medallions through TLC-licensed agents. Id. 
249 2014 TAXICAB FACT BOOK, supra note 205, at 12. 
250 TLC Rules § 58-20; 2014 TAXICAB FACT BOOK, supra note 205, at 8; Medallion 
Sales Information, supra note 247. 
251 See TLC Medallion Auction Homepage, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/industry/medallion_auction.shtml;  NYC Office of 
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transferred between private parties, and transfers are subject to a tax on 5% 
of the purchase price.252 These revenues are paid into the city treasury and 
credited to the general fund.253 New York City also imposes a 50-cent tax 
on taxicab rides starting in New York City and ending in the city or in 
certain counties.254 Uber cars do not charge this tax.255 Like New York City, 
there are other local taxicab licensing systems that generate revenue through 
various fees and taxes.256 
The failure of ridesharing services to embrace and operate under 
medallion licensing systems has been subject to much critique.257 We argue 
that such failure is another instance of tax opportunism at work. In effect, 
the unique business model of ridesharing companies has enabled them to 
argue that, unlike taxicabs, they are not subject to medallion licensing and 
the other fees and taxes imposed on taxicabs. The argument, in essence, is 
that ridesharing businesses are simply middlemen who bring private riders 
and drivers together. Some might argue that the ridesharing services’ failure 
to secure a medallion is simply illegal. However, at least some localities 
have signed off on this practice.258 Furthermore, tax avoidance does not 
                                                                                                                       
Management and Budget FY 2015-18 Fiscal Plan & Fiscal Plan Update, at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/omb/downloads/pdf/fp11_14.pdf; and 
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252 NYC Administrative Code Tit. 11, ch. 14; §§ 11-1401–11-1417; see also NY Tax 
Law §1201(j); TLC Rules § 58-43(b)(3). 
253 NYC Administrative Code Tit. 11, ch. 14; § 11-1417. 
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256 See, e.g., Santa Monica Municipal Code, § 6.49.040(i) (imposing franchise and 
permitting fees on taxicabs); San Francisco Code § 1116 (imposing transfer fee); see 
generally CITY OF SAN DIEGO OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT BUDGET ANALYST REPORT, 
TAXICAB PERMITTING POLICY AND REVENUE GENERATION (Feb. 10, 2012) (discussing San 
Francisco, New York, and Chicago as examples of cities with revenue raising taxicab 
regulatory systems). 
257 See sources cited supra note 234; see also Gregory Wallace, Uber CEO charged 
with operating illegal taxi service in South Korea, CNN MONEY (Dec. 24, 2014 at 
5:17pm), http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/24/technology/uber-south-korea/. 
258 In January 2015, Massachusetts enacted regulations governing businesses such as 
Lyft and Uber, designated a “Transportation Network Company” in the regulations. See 
540 CMR 2.05; see also 1278 Mass. Regis. 101 (Jan. 16, 2015). In New Orleans, the City 
Council is considering a proposal to allow ridesharing app-based transportation using 
personal vehicles. See Robert McClendon, Uber legalizations ordinances proposed by New 
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appear to be the motivation behind the ridesharing industry structure. Thus, 
it is more appropriate to view the ridesharing sector’s position on the 
medallion and fee system as taking advantage of an ambiguity that arose, 
rather than a carefully crafted regulatory arbitrage strategy involving costly 
structuring and modification of a transaction. Once again, tax opportunism 
is the better lens. 
Regardless of whether the position taken by ridesharing businesses with 
respect to medallions is sustainable, the decision to operate outside the 
medallion system has yielded tremendous benefits for ridesharing. It has 
lowered entry costs for drivers and the ridesharing companies themselves, 
and has helped ridesharing put pressure on the taxicab sector.  
   
4. Caveats 
 
A few concluding caveats: We do not claim that tax opportunism is the 
only regulatory response available to and undertaken by sharing actors. We 
expect that, depending on context, sharing economy actors will exhibit a 
range of responses to regulation, including both arbitrage and intentional 
noncompliance with the law. We also anticipate that there may be mixed or 
ambiguous cases of tax opportunism: In some cases, it may be questionable 
whether the transaction should be viewed as arbitrage (i.e., one that has 
been deliberately structured, in a manner that incurs some transaction costs, 
to secure larger regulatory benefits) or opportunism (taking advantage of an 
existing gap in the law).259 Sometimes, more than one motivation may be in 
play.  
The possibility that arbitrage and illegal conduct may also be part of the 
equation does not undermine the power of the tax opportunism frame, 
because tax opportunism highlights a number of salient features of the 
sharing economy that are not captured by either arbitrage or illegality: With 
respect to information reporting opportunism, the rise of the sharing 
economy follows on the heels of predecessor transactions and services, such 
as PayPal and Amazon. The recently enacted Form 1099-K reporting 
regime for “third party settlement organizations” was designed with 
businesses like PayPal and Amazon in mind, but perhaps did not envision 
subsequent business innovations such as Uber and TaskRabbit. This has 
presented a unique opportunity for sharing businesses to piggyback on this 
information reporting regime. The irony, of course, is that at the time of its 
enactment, Form 1099-K reporting was generally viewed unfavorably by 
                                                                                                                       
Orleans City Council members, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 23. 2015 at 7:22pm), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/01/uber-legalization_ordinance_pr.html.  
259 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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many businesses as an onerous imposition.260 In the context of sharing 
businesses like Lyft and Sidecar, however, embracing the most favorable 
interpretation of that regime has given such sharing businesses an advantage 
over traditional industry competitors. 
Finally, it is important to highlight that there is inherent messiness in all 
analysis of business design and regulatory strategy in the sharing economy. 
The very heart of sharing—the commercialization of often small scale 
excess personal capacity—involves individuals not otherwise engaged in 
commerce entering industries that in some cases have traditionally been 
subject to significant regulation. If those sharing earners had to comply with 
a high degree of regulation, they might be unable and unwilling to enter into 
sharing. It is likely that the designers of sharing platforms and business 
models understood that the entry barriers for small scale, periodic earners 
would need to be low in order to attract participation. Thus, though 
arguably not the prime driver of the design, regulatory realities were 
presumably not absent entirely from initial business conversations either. It 
is possible, even likely, that such regulatory realities have affected various 
aspects of how sharing has been set up, albeit not to the extent associated 
with traditional regulatory arbitrage.  
 
C.  The New Microbusiness Economy 
  
Tax opportunism aside, a second barrier to tax compliance in the 
sharing economy is the “microbusiness” nature of many sharing economy 
earners. There are several different aspects to the characterization of sharing 
workers as microbusinesses, and this characterization is intended to reflect a 
group of characteristics, rather than an analytically precise delineation. The 
sharing economy has attracted many individuals who previously were not 
“in business” and who are now barely in business, but have to file tax 
returns as small-business operators. A study commissioned by Uber found, 
based on drivers surveyed, that 52% of Uber drivers drive part-time for less 
than 30 hours a week. Of this 52%, 44% drove for less than 12 hours a 
week, 35% drove for 12-19 hours a week, and 21% drove for 20-29 hours a 
week.261 Also of this 52%, 6 out of 10 started driving for Uber within the 
last three months.262 There are reasons to believe that many, possibly even 
the majority, of drivers for other ridesharing services also drive part-time, 
and the part-time demographic is likely to be significant in other sharing 
                                                
260 See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, Credit Card Reporting Rules Could Burden Chain Firms, 
128 TAX NOTES 1028 (Sept. 6, 2010); Amy S. Elliott, Final Credit Card Reporting Regs 
Disappoint Practitioners, 28 TAX NOTES 820 (Aug. 23, 2010). 
261 See Uber Study, supra note 97. 
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sectors as well. 
 
1. New Microbusiness Earners  
 
These demographic characteristics give rise to unique compliance 
challenges. First, because many sharing workers may be reporting business 
income and expenses for the first time, they may be unfamiliar with keeping 
track of such income and expenses and may ignore or understate income 
earned or track expenses inadequately. The risk of this occurring is 
especially great in the absence of corroborative information reporting. In 
large part, we think that the “confusion” that has been expressed about tax 
issues raised by sharing earners has to do with the fact that people who are 
unfamiliar with the process of accounting for business income and expenses 
on their personal tax returns are now engaging in sharing economy 
microbusinesses. Even if they possess accurate information about the 
applicable tax rules, taxpayers engaged in sharing may nonetheless find it 
difficult to apply the rules and to maintain the required documentation.  
 
2. Part Time Nature of the Work 
 
Relatedly, the fact that much of sharing work is part-time raises unique 
compliance challenges. The part-time nature of the work means that dollar 
amounts of income are likely to be low. This raises three related risks. First, 
depending in part on the information reporting position taken by the sharing 
businesses, the income may escape reporting. For example, as discussed in 
Part III.A, the reporting positions taken by the ridesharing businesses mean 
than any driver earning amounts or driving trips short of the 200 
trips/$20,000 threshold will not be subject to reporting.263 Second, it is 
possible that the low dollar amounts may also cause sharing workers to pay 
less attention to accuracy than might otherwise be the case. Finally, it may 
not be worth IRS effort to audit individual returns of these microbusiness 
earners in order to determine compliance. Thus, traditional audit strategies 
may not be cost effective. 
Again, in some ways, these problems are not new. These concerns have 
been raised elsewhere in the small business sector and also in areas such as 
EITC compliance.264 In addition, these concerns may arise in traditional 
sectors with which the sharing sector competes. The taxicab industry, for 
example, arguably presents some of the same issues with respect to 
                                                
263 See infra Part III.A. 
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Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995); Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated 
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compliance and enforcement that we have discussed here, though there are 
some differences.265 The question of exactly how the sharing economy 
changes the tax compliance calculus as compared to its traditional-industry 
substitutes deserves further investigation. However, to the extent sharing is 
essentially the informal or small business sector writ widespread as a result 
of technological capabilities, and to the extent the new modes of production 
and consumption erode the traditional tax base, both greater policy attention 
and new compliance solutions may be required.  
 
3. Mixed-Use, Excess-Capacity Property 
 
Another feature of the sharing sector that might raise compliance issues 
derives from the nature of the property used. One of the foundations of 
sharing, at least at its outset, was the excess capacity monetization of 
personal property, such as homes, cars, bicycles, driveways, skills, or other 
assets. As such, a complexity that might be somewhat unique to this sector, 
at least in terms of intensity or frequency, is the extent to which the property 
used in the sharing activity is subject to substantial personal use. For 
example, it is likely that ridesharing drivers may make more extensive 
personal use of their cars than, say, taxicab drivers who rent a hacked up 
taxicab from a taxicab company. In the home sharing sector, too, there is 
likely to be substantially more very short term rental of real property that 
might be used for personal purposes the rest of the time.266  
The excess-capacity use of such mixed-used property raises particular 
tax compliance challenges and may require more intensive policing of the 
business-personal borderline. As illustrated in Part II.B, the rules regarding 
part-time rentals of real estate are very complex and require extensive 
expense tracking by hosts. In the ridesharing sector, the standard mileage 
method may provide some relief; however, business mileage must still be 
tracked. As a matter of compliance and enforcement, verification of expense 
and depreciation amounts and application of expense limitations may prove 
difficult.  
Again we do not claim that these issues occur only in the sharing sector. 
Mixed-use property is a feature of traditional businesses as well, with 
vacation homes, personal vehicles used for business, and home offices 
raising specific concerns.267 Our point is that in a sector largely premised on 
excess capacity use of personal property and skills, delineation of business 
versus personal expenses is likely to be a particular challenge, especially as 
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such mixed usage becomes more widespread. 
 
4. The Role of Paid Preparers and Other Advising Platforms 
 
Another aspect of tax compliance in sharing that needs to be 
investigated is the role that paid preparers are playing in the industry.268 
This is a question that needs to be investigated – for many sharing earners 
this may be the first tax year in which they are filing returns reflecting 
income and expenses from sharing. The same issues of unfamiliarity with 
the rules, inability to procure documentation, and failure to investigate 
positions taken may apply to paid preparers as well.  
In addition to traditional paid preparers, other sources of advice for 
sharing earners include websites such as 1099.is and zen99.com, as well as 
various forums and discussion threads that touch on how to comply with the 
tax laws. More investigation is needed to determine the accuracy of these 
sources of advice and their impacts on taxpayer reporting accuracy.269  
 
5. Attitudes towards tax compliance 
 
A final tax compliance issue that ought to be considered is the effects of 
sharing economy earner attitudes on tax compliance. Some commentators 
have noted that some sharing earners may feel or believe that their income 
from car or home sharing should not be taxed.270 This belief may stem, in 
part, from the idea that (1) the transactions are informal, based in “sharing 
or generosity,” and are not truly business transactions; or (2) a more 
generalized sensibility that the sharing economy should be exempt from 
traditional regulation. In any event, such attitudes and beliefs may prove to 
be a barrier to tax compliance and enforcement and should be closely 
monitored. 
 
IV. TAX ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES FOR SHARING AND BEYOND 
 
This Article has argued that tax compliance and enforcement in the 
                                                
268 The impact of tax preparers on taxpayer attitude and compliance has been the 
subject of some inquiry outside the sharing economy. See, e.g., James Andreoni, Brian 
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17 at 42-43. 
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facilitating rip-offs, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2014), 
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sharing sector may present unique challenges, due to two related features of 
the sector. First, the sharing businesses themselves engage in opportunistic 
regime selection in matters such as information reporting and worker 
classification. Second, many sharing workers are newly engaged in the 
sector at a microbusiness level; this presents challenges such as audit 
effectiveness, taxpayer education and miseducation, and unfamiliarity with 
independent contractor tax filing. The confluence of these two features 
means that sharing is likely to present unique and potentially serious tax 
compliance and enforcement complications. 
What measures might a tax authority take in proactively handle these 
challenges? In this Part, we explore strategies that a taxing authority might 
use to manage the unique issues raised by sharing. We divide these 
strategies into three broad groups: In Part IV.A, we consider concrete 
strategies that might be effective in responding to the problems raised by 
sharing in federal income and employment tax compliance. In Part IV.B, we 
discuss longer-term strategies and approaches that might be employed by 
federal, state and local taxing authorities in confronting sharing’s 
challenges. In Part IV.C we discuss the broader takeaways that can be 
gleaned from the rise of sharing that might be applicable to contexts beyond 
sharing.  
 
A.  Short-Term Strategies for Managing Sharing’s Challenges 
 
As this Article has argued, sharing is likely to raise tax compliance and 
enforcement challenges, particularly with respect to federal income and 
employment tax reporting. There are some obvious strategies that may be 
pursued in strengthening tax compliance.  
 
1. Clarify Worker Classification 
 
Probably the most obvious step that ought to be undertaken at the outset 
is to clarify whether sharing workers should be classified as independent 
contractors or employees. As discussed in Part II.C.1 and III.B.1, the 
sharing businesses have embraced independent contractor classification, but 
the issue is still before the courts. The question of classification needs to be 
decided as a threshold matter, because if some sharing earners are more 
accurately classified as employees, this would significantly change the 
withholding, information reporting, and other substantive tax obligations of 
the sharing businesses.271 
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2. Lowering Information Reporting Thresholds  
 
Assuming that the independent contractor classification of sharing 
earners is accurate, then other measures can be taken. Most importantly, to 
the extent that the information reporting positions taken by some sharing 
businesses are leading to non-reporting of sums below the threshold earned 
in the sharing economy, a simple solution might be to lower the Form 1099-
K information reporting threshold for third party settlement organizations or 
to clarify that the 200 transactions/$20,000 rule does not apply to sharing 
businesses.272 Lower reporting thresholds could help ensure that micro-
earners earning lower income amounts cannot avoid having such amounts 
reported to the IRS. As we discussed in Part III.A.2.d, the precise impacts 
of more complete Form 1099-K reporting is somewhat open to question, 
given the newness of both the Form 1099-K and of the sharing economy.273 
However, there is reason to think that clarifying that sharing businesses are 
not “third party settlement organizations” will improve tax reporting and 
compliance to some degree.  
Of course, lowering reporting thresholds would generate higher costs 
for sharing businesses required to report. We tend to think that such cost 
increases will be small. Given the technology-based nature of these 
businesses, it is likely that the businesses already have ready access to the 
information they would need. Lowering the information reporting 
thresholds will likely not drive up costs too significantly. 
 
3. Use of Safe Harbors and Advance Rulings 
 
While lowered information reporting thresholds may help with 
information corroboration, this only provides information about gross 
income receipts. It does not help in determining whether expenses have 
been accurately deducted and business and personal use of property 
correctly apportioned. There is reason to think that excessive expense taking 
                                                
272 See, e.g., Jeffrey Kahn and Gregg D. Polsky, The End of Cash, The Income Tax, 
and the Next 100 Years, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 159, 160, 165 (2013) (arguing that it is 
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273 See supra Part III.A.2.d. 
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might detract from tax collection in this sector.274 In order to ensure 
accuracy of expense taking, other measures might need to be adopted.  
One group of such measures that might prove effective is the enactment 
of safe harbors or advance rulings regarding what magnitude of expense 
taking is reasonable. We already see this type of approach, for example, in 
the use of the standard mileage method for vehicles.275 While standard 
mileage still requires computation of miles driven, the relatively convenient 
cents-per-miles safe harbor may serve as a de facto cap on excessive 
expense taking, by signaling what is reasonable and by making it easy to 
opt for the standard mileage amount. Rev. Proc. 2013-13 offers a similar 
simplified method for calculating the home office deduction.276 
It is also worth considering what types of strategies would likely not be 
effective in this area. The opportunistic behaviors of the sharing businesses 
discussed here involve the choosing of a more favorable regime over a less 
favorable one in situations where there is arguably a case to be made that 
either regime might apply. They do not involve deliberate structuring of the 
transactions and industry in order to take advantage of a loophole in the law 
while retaining the substance of the activity regulated. Thus, doctrines that 
have traditionally applied to tax shelters and other deliberately constructed 
transactions – such as economic substance, step transaction, substance over 
form, and sham transaction doctrines – are unlikely to prove effective in 
addressing the challenges raised by sharing. 
 
4. Sector-based Crackdowns 
 
Another strategy that may be effective in managing sharing’s challenges 
to federal tax compliance is the focusing of enforcement resources on the 
sharing economy in order to incentivize compliance. As discussed, one of 
the enforcement realities for microbusinesses is that any individual audit is 
unlikely to yield a high dollar amount of collection. However, if 
enforcement resources were to be concentrated, at least for short bursts, on 
the sharing sector, this might encourage self-monitoring and voluntary 
compliance on the part of sharing earners.  
Leigh Osofsky has argued for just such an approach in contexts where 
enforcement resources are scarce.277 Osofsky has argued that such “project-
based” or “concentrated enforcement” may yield higher levels of 
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compliance by virtue of increasing marginal returns to enforcement and 
psychological benefits than traditional worst-first methods.278 This type of 
concentrated enforcement may be particularly beneficial in a sector like 
sharing, where dollar amounts per audit might be low, but where there are 
reasons to think that psychological effects of targeted enforcement might be 
particularly pronounced by virtue of internet-based communication within 
the community of sharing earners. The IRS has used just such a 
concentrated enforcement strategy by disproportionately publicizing tax 
criminal convictions and civil injunctions in the weeks preceding the April 
income tax filing deadline.279  
 
5. Taxpayer Education 
 
Finally, another strategy to enhance compliance is taxpayer education, 
particular through the internet. The sharing sector earners are, in general, an 
internet-savvy population, since much of sharing is based on internet and 
smartphone platforms. Thus, the concern that web-based outreach will not 
reach certain taxpayers (which has been raised for populations such as low-
income taxpayers)280 is less likely to be a concern here. To the extent some 
commentators contend that sharing earners are confused about their tax 
reporting obligations, targeted taxpayer education using internet-based 
platforms might prove effective in this sector. 
 
B.  Medium- to Long-term Approaches 
 
Part A discussed some relatively obvious strategies that might be 
employed to facilitate compliance in the sharing sector. These are strategies 
that are attainable and are compatible with the structures of tax law and 
procedure as it currently exists. In addition to those relatively easy 
strategies and fixes, we suggest that there are certain features of the sharing 
economy that the IRS and other state and local tax authorities might 
consider harnessing in the medium- to long-term.  
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1. Harnessing Technology to Facilitate Compliance 
 
First, the tax law could evolve to make better use of the technologies 
upon which these new industries are based and to harness these 
technologies in assisting with tax compliance. The fact that sharing is so 
technology based yields benefits with respect to tax compliance, 
particularly as compared with traditional industries. For example, the 
mobile phone application used by ridesharing drivers tracks mile driven on 
each trip. This tracking of mileage may be used by the IRS in ensuring 
compliance and enforcement.281  
The idea that technology may be better harnessed for the interests of tax 
compliance is not new. James Alm and Jay Soled have argued that GPS 
technology may be more effectively used in ensuring accuracy of 
automobile deductions in general.282 Indeed, many traditional businesses are 
relying increasingly on technology-based tools and tracking in running their 
operations. Thus, while the use of technology is more pronounced in the 
sharing sector, consideration of how growing technological capabilities 
might impact the way we do tax compliance is important in other industries 
as well. Of course, such uses of technology raise privacy concerns.283 In 
designing new ways to harness technology, privacy concerns must be 
carefully weighed against the interests of tax enforcement. 
 
2. Harnessing the Sharing Businesses Themselves 
 
Harnessing of technological capabilities must almost by definition mean 
harnessing the sharing businesses themselves as information strongholds. 
While our suggested changes to the design and enforcement of Form 1099 
information reporting represent one aspect of harnessing the sharing 
businesses, this is not the only option. In addition to gross income receipts, 
the sharing businesses have access to a wide range of information, including 
miles driven (in ridesharing), number of days a property is rented, what 
amenities are included in a home sharing rental (which gives some sense of 
expenses incurred), and number of days worked (for tasksharing, dogsitting, 
and related activities). These types of information can be sought in helping 
promote compliance in the sharing sector. Furthermore, the sharing 
businesses are few and centralized enough that they have the ability to help 
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not record and track miles driven while looking for customers, so this solution has its 
limitations. 
282 Alm & Jay A., Soled, supra note 267, at 456-457. 
283 Michael Hatfield, Taxation and Surveillance: An Agenda (Jan. 13. 2015), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539835.  
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facilitate compliance for vast swaths of sharing economy workers.  
This approach has already been taken, for example, with respect to hotel 
taxes, in the form of agreements designating Airbnb as responsible for 
collecting local occupancy taxes in certain locations.284 Such arrangements 
effectively capitalize on the centralized nature of the sharing businesses and 
their ability to ensure compliance from a large number of sharing earners. 
Again, the collection and use of this information may raise privacy 
concerns, requiring a balancing of privacy against the enforcement gains 
that such information might generate. 
 
3. Utilizing Uniformity of the Sector 
  
The promise of harnessing both technology and the sharing businesses 
themselves as information strongholds in tax enforcement is bolstered by 
certain features of the sharing sector. We suggest that the IRS closely 
consider these industry characteristics in designing an approach to 
compliance and enforcement. 
First, at least as currently evolved, the sharing industry is relatively 
uniform and there are not that many major players. For example, with 
respect to ridesharing, Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar all operate on essentially the 
same model using similar technologies, and there are only a few major 
ridesharing companies.285 The same is true for the home sharing sector and 
other sharing sectors. Securing cooperation from these businesses would 
facilitate compliance and enforcement for a large number of sharing 
economy workers. It would also be relatively easy to liaise with the limited 
number of sharing businesses in procuring information. This is in contrast 
to, say, the taxicab sector, where there are many different taxicab companies 
in many different localities.  
Second, within the sharing sector, the ownership and economic 
arrangements are relatively uniform. For example, in the case of 
ridesharing, all Uber drivers are classified the same way by Uber.286 Many 
own their own cars. Many home sharers own their homes and rent them on 
an excess capacity business.  Thus, there is less heterogeneity of economic 
arrangements for a taxing authority to accommodate, as compared perhaps 
with traditional sectors, such as the taxicab industry.  
In sum, the relative uniformity of economic relationships in the sharing 
sector may make it easier for taxing authorities to design compliance and 
enforcement measures for the sector.  
 
                                                
284 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/653.  
285 See supra Part I.A. 
286 Whether the classification is correct is a different question. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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4. Third-Party Partnerships and Providers 
 
Finally, an emerging feature of the sharing landscape is the role that 
parties other than the sharing businesses or sharing earners themselves are 
increasingly playing in promoting or facilitating tax compliance. As 
discussed, websites such as 1099.is and tryzen99.com are now playing an 
important role in advising sharing earners on how to report income and 
expenses.287 Uber, for example, has recently partnered with Intuit to provide 
its drivers with help—in the form of access to QuickBooks Online with 
capability of TurboTax integration—in complying with their tax 
obligations.288 Furthermore, many sharing earners are technologically savvy 
enough to go online to discuss tax issues with peers and tax advising 
professionals on various discussion threads on websites such as intuit.com, 
reddit.com, and uberpeople.net.289 Such online forums may generate 
communities of compliance or non-compliance, depending on the prevailing 
norms in such forums. 
These third-party initiatives and interactions are still in the early stages 
of development and evolution, and it is possible, even likely, that they may 
evolve as the sharing sector evolves. What is clear is that, like the sharing 
businesses themselves, these initiatives and actors may prove to be 
influential contributors to taxpayer compliance or noncompliance, and may 
also serve as information sources for tax enforcement. Taxing authorities 
should thus pay attention to the evolution of these initiatives and 
interactions to evaluate how they might be harnessed in the tax compliance 
context. 
 
C.  Beyond Sharing  
 
Aside from specific prescriptions and recommendations, the sharing 
economy raises a number of broader questions that ought to be flagged. 
 
                                                
287 1099.IS, http://1099.is (describing itself as “a crowd-sourced repository of tax and 
accounting information for self-employed workers and folks getting side income”); ZEN99, 
https://www.tryzen99.com (“Zen99 provides the support services that contractors need in 
the growing 1099 economy”). 
288 INTUIT, http://www.intuit.com/company/press-room/press-releases/2015/Intuit-
Uber-partner-QBO-Self-Employed/. In January 2015, H&R Block, a nationwide tax 
preparation service, announced it was offering tax preparation discounts for Uber drivers. 
H&R BLOCK, http://newsroom.hrblock.com/hr-block-offers-tax-preparation-discount-
drivers-partner-uber/. 
289 See, e.g., INTUIT ANSWERXCHANGE, https://ttlc.intuit.com/questions/2640671-
today-i-rec-d-a-1099-k-from-uber-they-reported-to-the-irs-that-i-earned-approx-8k-more-
than-i-actually-rec-d-in-my-direct-deposit-should-i-contact-the-irs.  
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1. Tax Base Evolution and Changing Labor Markets 
 
First, commentators have pointed out that sharing reflects a broad 
change in the ways in which labor markets are structured and operate.290 In 
this framing, the advent of sharing represents the independent contractor 
economy writ large, an economy in which we see a “parcelization” of labor 
and where there are fewer traditional full-time employees, a large number of 
part-time workers, and less permanence and job security overall.291 These 
changes have been driven, in part, by the changing role of technology in 
facilitating businesses and intermediary relationships. Such relationships 
and intermediaries are now possible on a scale and with a rapidity that was 
not possible in the past, and may obviate the need for traditional 
employment arrangements. 
If sharing reflects a broader shift in market and industry structures and 
labor arrangements, we must question our ability to tax these new market 
relationships as a matter of tax administration and procedure. For example, 
will our current Form 1099 reporting rules be adequate to ensure 
compliance in this sector? Will the diffuse, part-time, independent 
contractor economy adversely impact the IRS’s ability to effectively audit? 
Are there lessons from taxation of the informal sector that might be brought 
to bear in taxing these new economic arrangements? These developments 
also raise potential tax base erosion issues. For example, will the rise of the 
independent contractor economy erode other sources of tax revenue (such as 
withheld-upon employee income)? Will there be base erosion caused by 
declining tax revenues from sectors with which sharing competes, such as 
the hotel and taxicab industries?292 
In these senses, the rise of sharing is not only about sharing. Rather, it 
also implicates changing economic relationships and structures and raises 
questions about how the tax system must adjust and adapt in order to 
continue to be effective. 
 
                                                
290 See, e.g., Weber, supra note 139; Weber, supra note 150; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
How the Future of Work May Make Many of Us Happier, WORLD POST (Jan. 21, 2015, at 
9:52am), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/annemarie-slaughter/future-of-work-
happier_b_6453594.html.   
291 See, e.g., Weber, supra note 139; see also Lily Kahng & Mary Louise Fellows, 
Costly Mistakes: Undertaxed Business Owners and Overtaxed Workers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 329 (2013) (arguing that disparate treatment of business owners and workers is 
particularly problematic given demands of the twenty-first century economy, in which 
business owners increasingly use independent contractors and temporary workers and 
business investment in workers is declining.) 
292 See, e.g., Zervas et al, supra note 5. 
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2. Unintended Applications of Newly Enacted Rules 
 
A second broad issue highlighted by the sharing example is the potential 
for tax rules adopted to facilitate tax administration and enforcement to be 
subsequently used in unexpected ways. As discussed, one of the biggest 
challenges to the effective taxation of sharing has been the information 
reporting positions taken by sharing businesses that have adopted the high 
reporting thresholds. These thresholds, enacted with intermediaries like 
Amazon and PayPal in mind, have now been embraced by the new sharing 
businesses as applicable to themselves. Relatedly, the rule providing that 
amounts subject to Form 1099-K reporting (irrespective of meeting the 
threshold) are no longer subject to Form 1099-MISC reporting has been 
used to justify not reporting at all. 
This experience with Form 1099-K reporting illustrates the perils of 
evolving and shifting business models, changes in technology, and the 
strategic use of favorable legislation not necessarily intended to apply to 
new economic arrangements. At the broadest level, the Form 1099-K 
experience suggests that regulatory regimes applicable to emerging 
industries should be closely considered and circumscribed with care. 
Legislators and regulators must act quickly to close loopholes as they arise. 
They should also be alert to the rise of new industries whose structure and 
design might create these types of opportunities. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The advent of the sharing economy has raised questions about the 
adequacy and application of current legal regimes in regulating sharing. 
These questions have arisen with respect to tax laws and regulations as well. 
We anticipate that such questions will only become more salient as the 
sharing sector develops and grows. In this Article, we closely examined the 
question of whether existing tax laws are sufficient to regulate sharing. 
What we found was that the answer is complicated. Contrary to the claims 
of some commentators, the application of significant portions of substantive 
tax law to sharing is not actually unclear. While the law itself might be 
complex, in many cases it is clear what rule applies. In a couple of 
respects—employment taxes and local occupancy taxes—the applicable 
substantive tax law is less clear, and such lack of clarity may result in tax 
compliance challenges. Even in these areas, however, we argue that the law 
has sufficient analytical categories to govern sharing transactions. What is 
needed is clarification of which regime applies, rather than completely new 
categories. 
On the other hand, even though the tax law is, for the most part, 
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sufficiently developed to address the new wave of sharing transactions, tax 
compliance and enforcement in the sharing economy may problematic. Two 
features of the sharing economy are particularly likely to generate tax 
compliance and enforcement issues: First, the opportunism displayed by 
some sharing businesses in claiming the application of the more favorable 
regulatory regime where ambiguity exists puts the onus on the taxing 
authority to take corrective action. Opportunistic embracing of favorable 
regulatory regimes allows the sharing businesses to obtain first mover 
regulatory advantages, even though corrective action might subsequently be 
taken. Second, the microbusiness character of sharing transactions raises tax 
compliance and enforcement difficulties for taxing authorities, particularly 
given scarce administrative resources. While we noted the types of tax 
compliance and enforcement issues that are likely to arise, we are aware 
that the sharing sector requires further study. We anticipate that this 
Article’s analysis will be a useful roadmap for such inquiry.  
In the face of the likely compliance and enforcement obstacles created 
by sharing, we recommended in this Article a number of steps and strategies 
that ought to be pursued in order to effectively confront these challenges. 
Some of our suggestions are medium- to long-term strategies. However, 
particularly with respect to federal tax compliance, even incremental 
changes such as lowering and clarifying information reporting thresholds 
and adoption of easy-to-apply safe harbors may go a long way toward 
managing this new wave of economic relationships.  
